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REED D. BENSON*

So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in
Common: Considering the Similarities
between Western Water Law and the
Endangered Species Act
ABSTRACT
The West has recently experienced major clashes over its scarce
water supplies, with traditional water users on one side and
endangered species on the other. These clashes, including those in
the Klamath and Middle Rio Grande basins, have pitted western
state water laws based on prior appropriationagainst the federal
Endangered Species Act (ESA). One could easily mistake these
laws for polar opposites, but, in fact, western water law and the
ESA share a number of important and ironic similarities. This
article identifies some of the similarities that arise from the basic
provisions of the laws and from the way they are implemented.
Despite these important similarities, however, recent efforts to
reform the laws have been notably one-sided, focusing almost
entirely on the ESA. The article concludes that the West will not
achieve a sustainable balance in water use by revising the ESA
alone.
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN WESTERN WATER
LAW AND THE ESA
For most of the 30 years since its enactment,' the federal
Endangered Species Act 2 (ESA or the Act) has been the nation's most
controversial environmental law. Ever since the Supreme Court's
strongly worded opinion in TVA v. Hill3 blocked completion of a large

* The author is an assistant professor of law at the University of Wyoming. Professor
Benson thanks Matt Gaffney and Lisa Dardy McGee, UW College of Law Class of 2004, for
their able assistance in researching this article. He also thanks Professors Michael Blumm
(Lewis & Clark), Debra Donahue (Wyoming), and Dan Tarlock (Chicago-Kent) for their
valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
3. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

federal dam to save the obscure Snail darter fish,4 critics of the ESA have
argued that it goes too far in limiting human activity in the name of
5
saving species.
The Snail darter controversy was just the first of many episodes
in which the Act has been criticized for favoring fish over people. In fact,
several of the most heated ESA conflicts have involved water disputes,
as those with traditional economic interests in using water -agricultural
irrigators, mostly-have challenged federal actions to preserve enough
water in lakes and rivers to support imperiled fishes. The following is
but a partial list of major water-use conflicts involving threatened or
endangered fish species.
The Klamath Basin. The Klamath River of Oregon and California
is the third-largest river on the U.S. west coast, but many people had
never heard of it until 2001, when a water crisis that had been quietly
brewing for many years suddenly exploded into a national news story. 6
An extreme drought left the Klamath Basin with a fraction of its normal
water supply, and federal officials concluded that what little water was
available was needed to ensure the survival of three fish species
protected by the ESA. 7 As a result, farmers who for decades had reliably
received water from a federal irrigation project got little or none in 2001.
The media stories of "farmers versus suckers" were oversimplified at
best, 8 but they helped turn the embattled Klamath Basin irrigator into a
powerful new poster child for the cause of revising the Act. The
controversy flared again in September 2002 when 33,000 salmon died in
the lower Klamath River, allegedly because irrigation demands left too
little water in the river to support salmon returns. 9

4.

Tellico Dam was later finished when Congress ordered its completion in spite of

the ESA. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 684 (2d ed. 1998).

5. For example, Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico, incensed over the prospect
that the water needs of the endangered silvery minnow might result in less water for
traditional users on the Rio Grande, recently referred to the Act as "a Frankenstein" and "a
monster." Consulting Process Required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and
Water, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Senator Domenici), available at http://epw.senate.
gov/hearing-statements.cfm?id=213020 (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Senate Comm.
ESA Hearing].
6. See Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water
and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 15 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 197, 214-28 (2002).
7. The species involved were the Lost River sucker, the Shortnose sucker, and the
southern Oregon-northern California stock of Coho salmon. Id. at 217.
8. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Cries of Save the Suckerfish Rile Farmers' Allies, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2001, at Al.
9. Laura Paskus, Sound Science Goes Sour, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 23, 2003, at 7-12.
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The Carson-Truckee Basin. The ESA became a key issue in a longrunning water dispute between Nevada irrigators and the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians.10 The farmers received water from the nation's
oldest federal irrigation project, but over time these irrigation diversions
had severely depleted and degraded Pyramid Lake at the heart of the
Tribe's reservation. 1 The Tribe's efforts to restore its traditional fishery
were aided when two Pyramid Lake fish species, the Cui-ui and
12
Lahontan cutthroat trout, were listed under the ESA. Water demands
the Tribe,
for these fishes became a source of strife and litigation among
13
irrigators, and federal agencies for more than two decades.
The California Central Valley. California's rivers supply irrigation
to
many thousands of farms and millions of people, but they also
water
provide habitat to imperiled fish species including Chinook salmon and
Delta smelt.14 For more than a decade, Central Valley irrigators have
tried to fight off a variety of ESA-based restrictions on their water
supplies, just as environmentalists have sought to ensure adequate flows
for protected fish species. Litigated disputes have involved a range of
subjects, from the renewal of irrigation water contracts 5 to the federal
government's right to allocate water from its storage projects in times of
16
drought.
The Methow Valley. In this scenic (and dry) eastern Washington
basin, farmers tangled with federal officials over irrigation water
restrictions imposed to protect threatened salmon and steelhead. Unlike
most other farmers who have faced water supply restrictions under the
Act, the Methow irrigators did not receive water from a project built by
the US. government. Rather, their irrigation ditches crossed federal land,
and the permits allowing this use of federal land were modified under
the ESA to ensure adequate water flows for fish. 17 Irrigators and local

10. See John Kramer, Lake Tahoe, The Truckee River and Pyramid Lake: The Past, Present
and Futureof InterstateWater Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1339, 1341-59 (1988).
11. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 119 n.7 (1983).
12. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 259 (9th Cir.
1984).
13. A few of the many Carson-Truckee water cases are Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S.
110 (1983); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1989); and
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 254 (D.D.C. 1973).
14. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1995).
15. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1998).
16. Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 (E.D. Cal. 1992),
affd, 10 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1993).
17. David E. Filippi, The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Water Rights and Water
Use, 2002 PROC. ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-12-14.
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governments sued to challenge the federal government's authority to
impose these restrictions, and lost. 18
The Rio Grande River. At the time of this writing, New Mexico
was home to the nation's hottest ESA dispute, involving the need to keep
water flowing to prevent the extinction of the endangered Rio Grande
silvery minnow. Environmentalists sued to require the federal
government to ensure that the overworked and drought-stricken Middle
Rio Grande does not dry up due to water diversions for cities and farms.
Irrigators, the City of Albuquerque, and the State of New Mexico joined
the federal government in opposing the suit, arguing that saving the
minnow could mean economic ruin. In June 2003, a divided panel of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal government is not
barred from releasing water for the silvery minnow, even if such releases
result in delivery of less water for irrigation, municipal, and other uses. 19
The decision prompted New Mexico politicians to seek relief from
Congress, which enacted the 2004 Interior appropriations bill with a
rider that largely overturns the Tenth Circuit's decision and restricts
20
options for providing water to ensure the minnow's survival.
These five conflicts, like most others involving the ESA and
water use,21 all take place in the West. This fact should not surprise the
informed reader. Since the days of the pioneers, battling for water has
largely been a western pastime. 22 The West, of course, is easily the driest
region of the United States, with most areas averaging less than 20 inches
18. Okanogan County v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CS-01-192-RHW (E.D.
Wash., Mar. 14, 2002), affd, 347 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2003).
19. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003).
20. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004, H.R. 2754, 108th Cong.
§ 208(a and b) (2003) (passed Nov. 18, 2003); Associated Press, Congress OKs Energy-Water
Bill Including Minnow Language, ABQJoURNAL.cOM, Nov. 18, 2003, at http://www.abq
journal.com/drought/apenrgyll-19-03.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Minnow
Language].
21. Other western river basins that have experienced conflicts over water use and the
ESA include the Columbia, see Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the
Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999); the
Lower Colorado, see Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp.2d 53 (D.D.C. 2003); and
the Edwards Aquifer region around San Antonio, Texas, see Todd H. Votteler, The Little
Fish That Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater Law, and Private Property
Rights Collide over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENvTL. L. 845 (1998). For a thoughtful look
at the ESA's effect on river management in the Columbia and Upper Colorado basins, see
Mary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The EndangeredSpecies Act as Applied to
EndangeredRiver Ecosystems, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 197 (1998).
22. A leading casebook on water law sums it up: "One may ask why we have chosen
such a preponderance of western cases... .The answer is easy. The West is dry, and this has
heightened anxiety and conflict over water. As one court observed, 'Water litigation is a
weed that flowers in the arid West.'" A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT viii (5th ed. 2002) (citation omitted).
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of precipitation annually-not enough to grow most crops without
artificial water supplies.23 Consequently, most of the nation's agricultural
24
irrigation takes place in the western states, and irrigation accounts for
2
over 80 percent of water withdrawals in most of the West. 5 Water
demands for irrigation are highest in the summer and early fall when
western rivers and streams naturally run low; thus, many of these
streams are routinely dried up or reduced to a trickle by water
27
diversions. 26 Low flows also tend to exacerbate water quality problems,
including high temperatures that may be stressful or even lethal to
aquatic life. Other streams maintain a hearty flow in the late summer
because of water releases from upstream dams, but those same dams
have dramatically altered these streams' natural character. These are
some of the fundamental reasons why the West has a large number of
threatened and endangered aquatic species and why many of these
species are struggling to survive in places where their habitat needs
2
conflict with existing water demands for irrigation. 8
Legally, many of these conflicts arise in the West because of the
water law of the western states, which allocates rights to use water based
29
on the doctrine of prior appropriation. As explained below, western
23.

WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:

CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 2-1 (june 1998).

24.

Irrigation is the biggest user of freshwater in the United States, and ninety percent

of U.S. irrigation is in the West. WAYNE B. SOLLEY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

CIRCULAR 1200, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN1995, at 6 (1998).
25. Irrigation accounts for 80 percent of freshwater withdrawals in California, 81
percent in the Lower Colorado Basin, 82 percent in the Pacific Northwest, 85 percent in the
Great Basin, 90 percent in the Rio Grande Basin, and 95 percent in the Upper Colorado. In
the Arkansas-White-Red and Missouri River Basins, which lie only partially in the West,
irrigation accounts for 57 percent and 68 percent of water withdrawals respectively. Id. at
10.
26. DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION 40 (1997).
27. The effects of water storage, diversion, and use on water quality may be
summarized as follows:
Every water use changes water quality. Critical characteristics such as
temperature and chemical composition are affected when water is
removed from a stream or held in a reservoir. Most uses also result in
returning some of the water diverted to the stream, typically laden with
pollutants picked up along the way. Further, every depletion of the water
in a stream can cause the concentration of natural or human-caused
contaminants to increase in the water that remains.
David H. Getches et al., Controlling Water Use: The Unfinished Business of Water Quality
Protection 4 (1991).
28. Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: EndangeredFish versus
IrrigatedAgriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 348 (1996) (finding that counties in the West
with the greatest amount of irrigated agriculture also have the highest number of
endangered fish species).
29. See infra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
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water law has created private property rights to use otherwise-public
water resources, and these rights generally last forever. State laws
impose few if any meaningful environmental constraints on the exercise
of these rights, meaning that water users in the West routinely dry up
streams- legally. By creating and perpetuating this system of water
rights, and then administering that system loosely, the western states
have failed to provide for the water needs of aquatic ecosystems and
have fostered a common belief that government has no authority to
regulate established water uses for environmental purposes.
It is easy to imagine why disputes often arise involving western
water law and the ESA. The two legal regimes were developed in
different eras by different levels of government to serve distinctly
different purposes. Prior appropriation took root in the Wild West of the
mid- to late-nineteenth century30 and was adopted by the states (with
considerable federal deference 3') to encourage development and
maximum use of an economic resource. 32 By contrast, the ESA was
enacted by Congress as command-and-control legislation to effectuate
the environmental protection vision -of the early 1970s. 33 Given these
differences in their backgrounds, and the increasing number and
intensity of conflicts between the two, it would be easy to conclude that
western water law and the ESA are as different as any two legal concepts
could be.
Easy, perhaps, but wrong. In many fundamental ways the Endangered Species Act and western water law based on prior
appropriation are very much alike -more so, perhaps, than devotees of
either one would care to admit. These ironic similarities help explain, as
much or more than the obvious differences do, why western water law
and the ESA often conflict.
Despite these similarities, recent reform efforts have been
notably one-sided. The past several years have seen a strong political
push for significant ESA revisions, but no comparable campaign to
change western water law. While critics fault the ESA for a variety of real
30. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 46-47 (Cal. 1855) (rejecting common-law rule of
riparian water rights in favor of the first-in-time, first-in-right-rustoms of the mining camps
on the public domain); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (holding that
Colorado had always recognized prior appropriation).
31. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 22, at 105-10.
32. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "Because of the vital importance of water in
this arid region both our statutory and decisional law have been fashioned in recognition of
the desirability and of the necessity of insuring the highest possible development and of the
most continuous beneficial use of all available water with as little waste as possible."
Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861,863 (Utah 1969) (citations omitted).
33. PLATER ET AL., supra note 4, at 672-74.
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or perceived problems, those same critics ignore identical shortcomings
in the water laws. This article contends that efforts to revise the ESA
without reforming the water laws will not produce balanced water
policy and management in the West.
Part II of this article provides bare-bones background on western
water law, the ESA, and the interaction between the two. Part III
identifies overlooked similarities between these laws and offers reasons
why these similarities tend to exacerbate water use conflicts involving
endangered species. Part IV discusses the policy implications of these
similarities and concludes by suggesting that current ESA reform efforts,
in isolation, will not produce balanced solutions to the West's water
problems.
II. WESTERN WATER LAW AND THE ESA: THE BASICS
A. The Water Law of the Western States
In the United States, the laws governing water allocation and use
are chiefly state laws, and the water laws of the western states are
primarily based on the doctrine of prior appropriation. 34 In these states,
water is officially a public resource, 35 but the states have recognized
36
permanent property rights in the private use of that resource. These
water rights typically last forever as long as they are used; that is, a
water right holder who actually exercises her right to use water will not
lose it.3 7 Moreover, the oldest water rights have the highest priority, and
34. The states of the Rocky Mountain West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) basically have always followed the prior
appropriation doctrine, whereas the states of the West Coast and Great Plains all
converted - to a greater or lesser degree - to prior appropriation after initially recognizing
common-law riparian rights. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 26, at 24-27. The riparian
rights doctrine, the traditional water law of the eastern and midwestern states, allows all
landowners along a natural watercourse to make "reasonable use" of its waters on lands
adjacent to it. Id. at 13-16. Thus, under classic riparian principles, shortages are shared
among users, while under prior appropriation principles, junior users bear shortages and
senior users are protected.
35. "States included claims to 'ownership' of all the water within their boundaries in
their constitutions and statutes. In effect, this was an assertion of state authority to
supervise the allocation of water, usually made in the context of protecting the public's
interest in achieving maximum benefit from the use of a public resource." David H.
Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions
Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7-8 (2001) (citations omitted).
36. Gregory J. Hobbs, Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L.
37, 41 (2002).
37. While water rights last forever so long as water is actively used, the corollary is a
basic tenet of prior appropriation law: "use it or lose it."
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if there is not enough water to satisfy all the users on a particular
stream-a common situation in the West-"senior" right holders get
their full water entitlement before "juniors" get any.38
It has long been said that "beneficial use is the basis, the
measure, and the limit of a water right" under prior appropriation. 39 This
phrase means two things: first, a user obtains a right by applying water
to a so-called "beneficial use," an activity that the law recognizes as
providing some social benefit. 40 Second, by applying water to a specific
beneficial purpose, the water user obtains a right to that quantity of
water reasonably needed for that specific purpose and no more; "waste"
4
of water is officially prohibited. 1
Western water law has always recognized a variety of beneficial
uses 42 but has not treated all uses equally. Until recent years, the law
would not recognize rights to use water beneficially as it flows in its
natural course-that is, "instream" water rights. In order to establish an
appropriative water right, a user would first have to divert or withdraw
water from its natural course. Even after the law began regarding
instream uses as beneficial, the diversion requirement prevented
instream users from gaining legal protection 43 against later (and more
junior) appropriators, whose uses could destroy the instream use by
taking all the water from the stream. Today, most states in the West do
recognize instream water rights in some form but allow only state
agencies to obtain such rights, thus sharply limiting their effectiveness. 44
Many elements of a water right are fixed at the time the right is
established. Perhaps most importantly, the right's priority date -the date
on which the original appropriator took the first steps legally necessary
to obtain a new water right- determines whether the right holder is

There are two doctrines that have developed from the use it or lose it
principle: abandonment and forfeiture. Abandonment is based on
common law and is defined as "an intentional relinquishment of a known
right." Forfeiture, on the other hand, is a doctrine created by statute and
requires no intent.
Krista Koehl, Partial Forfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon Compromises Traditional Principles to
Achieve Flexibility, 28 ENVTL. L. 1137,114243 (1998) (citations omitted).
38. Hobbs, supra note 36, at 4143.
39. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 920 (1998).
40. Id. at 923-28.
41. Id. at 92846.
42. Id. at 924-28.
43. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406
P.2d 798, 800-01 (Colo. 1965) (denying water right for instream use based on absence of
diversion, despite statute authorizing instream appropriations).
44. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 26, at 120-29.
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likely to get any water if there is not enough to go around. The source of
water, season of use, and the maximum amount that can be used-both
45
in terms of instantaneous flow and annual volume - are also set at the
time the water right is established. Other fixed elements of a water right
include the type of use, place of use, and point of diversion; these
elements may be changed, but only with the prior approval of the state,
users by reducing the
and only if the change does not injure other water
46
getting.
to
accustomed
are
amount of water they
States do not impose meaningful environmental constraints on
the exercise of existing water rights. Thus, an appropriator can legally
take the last drops of water from a stream so long as he is within the
legal limits of his water right. Several western states still offer little or no
effective legal protection for instream flows, and even where such
protections exist, they do not prevent streams from being depleted or
dried up by the exercise of senior water rights -especially since most
47
such protections took effect rather recently. Moreover, while states
have some authority to regulate water use under the federal Clean Water
Act-that is, to regulate water quantity for the sake of ensuring water
quality48- states in the West have largely avoided exercising this
49
authority.
In sum, western water law in practice provides nearly complete
protection to existing water rights and allocates increasingly scarce water
supplies based almost solely on the age of these water rights.

45. The maximum flow rate that may be diverted at any moment is typically called the
"rate" of the water right, while the maximum annual volume is often called the "duty."
46. A classic statement of transfer principles is found in Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 631-32 (Colo. 1954).
47. Some states have very few river segments where instream flows are protected.
Others have a greater number of protected reaches, but all the protections have junior
priority dates, meaning that flows may fall below "protected" levels if there is not enough
water to satisfy both the instream flow right and senior water users. GILLILAN & BROWN,
supra note 26, at 144.
48. In PUD No. I v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711-21 (1994), the
Supreme Court upheld Washington's authority under the Clean Water Act to impose
minimum streamflow conditions on a hydroelectric project. The Court rejected arguments
that the Clean Water Act allowed for regulation only of water quality, not quantity, calling
this "an artificial distinction." Id. at 719-21.
49. "[T]raditionally, when there is a conflict between protection of water quality and
the right to water use established by prior appropriation, it has been resolved in favor of
allowing the water use... Several [western] states have proclaimed that water quality
regulation will not affect water uses or water rights." GETCHES, supra note 27, at 89-91
(citations omitted).
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B. The Endangered Species Act
Enacted in 1973, the ESA is one of America's best known and
most important environmental laws. The ESA's purpose is to conserve
endangered species 50 and the ecosystems on which they depend. 51 As the
U.S. Supreme Court stated, "examination of the language, history, and
structure of the legislation.. .indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." 52
For purposes of this article, four sections of the ESA are
noteworthy. Section 453 governs the process for listing species as
endangered or threatened. 54 The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service or, for
oceangoing species, the National Marine Fisheries Service (the Services)
must make listing decisions "solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available." 55, 56 Section 4 also provides a means by
which the Services may extend full ESA protection to threatened as well
as endangered species. 57 In addition, this section requires designation of
"critical habitat"58 for any species at the time it is listed, although
the
Services routinely fail to do so. 59 The Services must ignore economics in
making listing decisions but consider economics in determining critical
60
habitat.

50. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
52. TVA. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000).
54. The ESA defines an endangered species as one that is "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range," 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000), while a
threatened species is one that is "likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2000).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2000).
57. Section 9 prohibits any person from "taking" endangered fish or wildlife. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538 (a)(1)(B) (2000). However, the Services typically extend "take" protection to
threatened species by issuing rules under ESA § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2003) requires critical habitat designations at the time of
listing "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable." Critical habitat may include
areas either inside or outside the area actually occupied by the species, provided they are
determined to be essential to the conservation of the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (2000).
59. As of 1999, only ten percent of listed species had a designated critical habitat.
Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat
Protection versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 224 (2000). Darin's article
explores some of the reasons why the agencies often do not designate critical habitat,
despite the language and intent of the Act.
60. Critical habitat determinations must be made "after taking into consideration the
economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as
critical habitat." 16 U.S.C § 1533(b)(2) (2000).
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Section 7 applies only to federal agencies, and it is here that the
Act's regulatory rubber most commonly meets the road. All federal
agencies must avoid taking actions that may cause jeopardy to any listed
species. 61 In order to ensure that all agencies meet this substantive
standard, the Act mandates a process whereby the acting agency must
"consult" with the relevant Service if the agency's proposed action may
adversely affect a listed species. 62 If the Service determines that the
proposed action may jeopardize the species, it must suggest "reasonable
and prudent alternatives" to avoid jeopardy while meeting the purposes
of the proposal.63 The agency may not proceed with the proposed action
until consultation is completed. 64 If the agency wants to go ahead with
the proposed action despite a jeopardy opinion, it may seek an ESA65
exemption from the cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee,
better known as the "God Squad." Finally, section 7 directs all agencies
66
affirmatively to use their existing authorities to conserve listed species,
although courts have rarely found an agency to have fallen short of this
67
requirement.

61. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides that each federal agency "shall, in consultation
with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded or
carried out by such agency.. .is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification" of designated critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). Rather
remarkably, the statute does not define the crucial term of "jeopardize the continued
existence," but Interior Department regulations define it as "to engage in an action that
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood
of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1999).
62. The "consultation" provided in section 7(a)(2) culminates in a Biological Opinion
(also known as a BiOp or BO) issued by the relevant service assessing the likely effects of
the agency's proposed action on a listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (2000).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000).
64. According to the statute,
After initiation of consultation... the Federal agency and the permit or
license applicant shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources with respect to the agency action which has the
effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable
and prudent alternative measures which would not violate subsection
(a)(2) of this section.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2000).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (2000) specifies the membership, standards, and procedures of
the "God Squad."
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000).
67. See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and
Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107,
1126-137 (1995), and cases cited therein; but see Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 618
(5th Cir. 1998).
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Section 9 applies to all persons, 68 not just federal agencies, and
prohibits (among other things) a "take" of any member of a protected
species of fish or wildlife. 69 Under the Act, "'take' means to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct." 70 The Fish and Wildlife Service by rule has
defined "harm" in this context to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife," 71
thus bringing some habitat destruction on private lands within the Act's
prohibition of take. 72 In addition, some federal courts have held that state
or local governments violate the Act by permitting certain private actions
73
that, in turn, cause harm to protected species.
Finally, section 10 provides for the issuance of permits allowing
the legalized "take" of protected species by non-federal entities where
the take would be "incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out
of an otherwise lawful activity." 74 The applicant for such an incidental
take permit must submit a conservation plan, better known as a habitat
conservation plan or HCP, describing (among other things) the
applicant's steps to mitigate or minimize take and the funding available
for these efforts. 75 If the Service finds, in essence, that the HCP will
minimize taking as much as practicable and that any authorized taking
will not cause jeopardy to the affected species, 76 it must issue the permit.
The incidental take permit provisions were added to the ESA in 198277
and were little used for the first ten years, but HCPs became much more
popular during the Clinton Administration. 78
68. Section 9 applies to "any person," 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000), and the Act defines
"person" broadly. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2000).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000). Note that listed species of plants are not included
in this prohibition.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
71. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
72. The Supreme Court upheld this rule in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapterof Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
73. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 162-66 (1st Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals
held that the State of Massachusetts violated the ESA by issuing permits for fixed fishing
gear to be placed in Massachusetts coastal waters, where such gear was causing harm to
endangered whales.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2000). Issuance of the permit must "not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild," a standard
very similar to the regulatory definition of "jeopardize the continued existence" found at 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
77. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. 1411
(1982).
78. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the ESA protects threatened and endangered species
nationwide. While it gives special responsibilities to federal agencies, its
general ban on actions that kill or harm protected species extends even to
private persons and private lands.
79
C. The Interaction of Western Water Law and the ESA

Although conflicts over water use and endangered species have
grown in recent years, the ESA's potential to affect water development
and use has been obvious since at least 1978, when the Supreme Court
80
decided the landmark case of TVA v. Hill. Finding the Act to be a clear
statement of congressional intent to accord the highest priority to
endangered species protection, the Court enjoined the completion of
Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River in order to prevent jeopardy to
the endangered Snail darter. After acknowledging that it "may seem
curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number of threeinch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require
the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress
has expended more than $100 million," the Court held "that the explicit
81
provisions of the Endangered Species Act require precisely that result."
The Act makes only one mention of state water allocation laws,
declaring, "the policy of Congress is that Federal agencies shall
cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues
82
in concert with conservation of endangered species." In stating policy
with respect to state water laws, the ESA is notably less deferential than
the Clean Water Act, which declares that it does not preempt either state
83
authority over water allocation or state-recognized water rights. Given

79. Other authors have addressed the interaction of the ESA and western water law in
some depth. Notable articles include A. Dan Tarlock, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Western
Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1985); Jennie L. Bricker & David E. Filippi,
Endangered Species Act Enforcement and Western Water Law, 30 ENvTL. L. 735 (2000); and
Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72 U. COLO. L.
REV. 361 (2001).
80. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
81. Id. at 172-73.
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2000).
83. Section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000), known as the
"Wallop Amendment" for former Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, provides,
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded,
abrogated or otherwise impaired by this Act. It is the further policy of
Congress that nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any
State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to
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Congress's history of explicit deference to state water laws, particularly in
the West, 84 it is significant that the ESA instead calls for cooperation and
conservation.85
Over the past 20 years, the ESA has shown that it can affect
water development and use not simply by restricting new projects, but
also by limiting the exercise of established water rights. The ESA applies
most commonly to water use in situations where the use depends on
some discretionary approval or action from a federal agency and is,
therefore, subject to the procedural and substantive requirements of
section 7. For example, the Act may block development of new water
projects requiring federal permits if the projects might cause jeopardy to
listed species. 86 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) must complete
ESA consultation before making any new water supply commitments,
even if it is renewing existing contracts to deliver irrigation water. 87 The
USBR must also consult on how it operates its existing water supply
projects if these operations might adversely affect a listed species.88
Finally, the USBR may have to reduce water deliveries to irrigators
under long-established contracts if the water is needed instead to ensure
the survival of species protected by the ESA. 89
One innovative approach to section 7 compliance is the Upper
Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Program, probably the most well
established example of a collaborative, basin wide process for ensuring
that water management and use comply with the ESA. 90 Interior
develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate
pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources.
84. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-70 (1978).
85. In fact, some in Congress tried in 1982 to add a provision to the ESA identical to the
Wallop Amendment of the Clean Water Act but settled instead for the language in 16
U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2000). See Tarlock, supra note 79, at 19.
86. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 512-14 (10th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting argument that federal environmental laws may not result in adverse effects on
state-issued water rights).
87. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125-28 (9th Cir. 1998).
88. Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F. Supp.
2d 1228, 1240-47 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
89. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681-84 (9th Cir. 1995); Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109,1138 (10th Cir. 2003).
90. The Colorado River program has been summarized as follows:
The Upper Colorado Recovery Program is a consensus-based program
produced in the wake of... USFWS' regulatory actions in the 1970s that
limited the states' and water users' ability to fully use and develop
Compact-guaranteed water... .The USFWS formed a coordinating
committee in 1984 consisting of the USFWS; the Bureau of Reclamation;
the States of Colorado, Utah and Wyoming; organizations of water users
from Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; and two representatives from
national environmental groups. The committee ultimately developed a
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Secretary Norton recently stated, "We should have more Upper
91
Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Programs and fewer Klamaths."
Serious questions persist, however, about the ecological effectiveness of
this program. As stated by one observer, "Although it is unclear how
effective the program has been to date in terms of restoring the fish, the
Upper Colorado Program is widely considered a 'success,' since it
satisfies the Section 7 requirement, yet still allows water development to
92
proceed."
All water users, whether they have any federal connections or
93
not, are prohibited from causing a "take" of a listed species. However,
section 9 of the ESA has had limited effects on water use thus far. In one
case, an irrigation district was found to have caused a take by operating
a water diversion with inadequate fish screens, causing the death of
listed fish either at the diversion itself or in the defendant's irrigation
canals. 94 The court stated,

plan, known as the Recovery Implementation Program.. .The RIP
combines five principle elements: habitat management (flows), habitat
development, native fish stocking, nonnative species management, and
research. Not surprisingly, the most controversial aspect of the RIP
involves flows that are deemed critical to fish survival. The RIP generally
allows new projects to continue depleting the Colorado River Basin but
contains measures to offset the water losses by seeking instream
appropriations through state water appropriation laws. Depletion charges
are assessed against new projects.
Wood, supra note 21, at 229-30 (citations omitted).
91. Secretary Norton's press release goes on to state, "The Upper Colorado Program,
put together through a collaborative effort, provides for the recovery of endangered species
and the continued use and development of water for people, cities and farms." Press
Release, U.S. Interior Department, Office of the Secretary, Interior Secretary Norton Urges
Locally-Driven, Cooperative Solutions to Avert Water Crises (June 6, 2003) (on file with
author).
92. Hannah Gosnell, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and the Art of Compromise:
The Evolution of a Reasonable and PrudentAlternative for the Animas-La Plata Project, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 561, 573-74 (2001) (citations omitted). The author also notes,
Twelve years and $75 million later, none of the fish have been delisted,
and it has become obvious that the recovery effort will take much longer
than anticipated. The effort to allow water development to continue,
however, has fared quite well. In spite of the Jeopardy Opinion for further
water development on the Colorado, over 270 projects have been
permitted in the three participating states with the recovery program
serving as the [reasonable and prudent alternative].
Id. at 573 (citations omitted). See also Wood, supra note 21, at 248-49.
93. As noted above, the ESA's prohibition against take of listed fish and wildlife
applies to "any person." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000).
94. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1129-30 (E.D. Cal.
1992).
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The Act provides no exemption from compliance to
persons possessing state water rights, and thus the
District's state water rights do not provide it with a special
privilege to ignore the Endangered Species Act. Moreover,
enforcement of the Act does not affect the District's water
rights but only the manner in which it exercises those
rights. 95
It seems equally clear that a water withdrawal would cause an
illegal take if it caused the death of listed species by removing all the
water from a stream; the National Marine Fisheries Service has stated
that water withdrawals are "very likely to injure or kill" fish protected
by the Act. 96 There has been little section 9 enforcement activity against
irrigators for drying up streams inhabited by listed fish, although an
enforcement threat against irrigators in the Walla Walla River Basin led
to a successful flow restoration agreement. 97 More recently, a U.S. district
court in Idaho issued the first decision finding a take based on stream
dewatering and permanently enjoined a private irrigator from diverting
water from Otter Creek without specific structures in place to protect
98
threatened bull trout.
95. Id. at 1134.
96. In publishing its final rule under ESA section 4(d) on take of certain populations of
Pacific Northwest salmon and steelhead, the National Marine Fisheries Service made the
following statement:
NMFS agrees that water diversions and discharge may have other
deleterious effects [beyond changes in stream temperatures] on salmonid
habitat. These may include impacts on sediment transport, turbidity, and
stream flow alterations. The actual likelihood that these actions would
result in take depends on situation-specific conditions.... NMFS has
revised the take guidance. One change is that water withdrawals have been
added to the list of activities that are very likely to injure or kill salmonids.
65 Fed. Reg. 42,422,42,429 (2000) (emphasis added).
97. See infra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
98. Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, Civ. No. 00-0730-E-BLW (D. Idaho, Nov. 14,
2002). The court concluded its opinion as follows:
[Tihe diversion significantly modifies the habitat of the bull trout by
reducing flows below the diversion and diverting bull trout into the
irrigation ditch. This significant modification of habitat poses two threats
to the bull trout. First, in a below-average water year, the diversion is
likely to reduce flows in Otter Creek just below the diversion to the point
where spawning bull trout could not migrate past the diversion in August
and September. Second, the diversion diverts bull trout into the unsuitable
habitat of the irrigation ditch, exposing them to injury....These two threats
combine to create a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to the bull
trout under § 9 of the ESA. Thus, IWP is entitled to the issuance of a
permanent injunction. The injunction will enjoin the Joneses from
operating the diversion without (1) a head gate to monitor flows on Otter
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Traditional water users and their allies have long argued that
environmental restrictions on the exercise of their water rights could
amount to a taking of private property requiring compensation, 99 and
now a reported decision, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United
States, directly supports their position. 100 The Court of Federal Claims
found that ESA restrictions that temporarily reduced the water supply to
California State Water Project irrigators took their water rights, based
largely on a remarkable holding that these regulatory restrictions
effected a physical (not regulatory) taking 01' Tulare was the first case to
find that restrictions imposed under the ESA amounted to a taking of
10 2
private property, but its importance as precedent remains to be seen.
Conflicts between western water law and the ESA have
increased dramatically in the past decade. The Klamath and Rio Grande
conflicts have been especially intense and acrimonious and have focused
attention on the clash between water users with water rights based on
prior appropriation and endangered aquatic species whose habitat is
protected by the ESA. Lost in all this controversy, however, are some
ironic similarities between these contending laws.
III. SOME BASIC SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE ESA AND
WESTERN WATER LAW
In support of their argument that the ESA should defer to state
water laws and water rights, critics often argue that the Act is seriously

Creek to ensure that bull trout can migrate past the diversion, and (2) a
fish gate to prevent bull trout from being diverted into the irrigation ditch.
Slip op. at 21 (footnote omitted).
99. See, e.g., Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Ecological Integrity and Water Rights Takings in the
Post-Lucas Era at 74-82, in WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE (Kathleen Marion

Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995).
100. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (Fed. Cl.
2001).
101. Id.
102. See Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act,
and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 586-87 (2002). Water users who receive water
under contracts with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation face especially great challenges
because these contracts typically have a provision that shields the federal government from
liability for failure to deliver a full supply of water. Courts have held that these provisions
authorize the USBR to reduce contract water deliveries as needed to comply with the ESA.
O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681-84 (9th Cir. 1995); Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v.
Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003). The Tulare court distinguished O'Neill because
the federal government was not contractually shielded from liability in Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at
321, but did not seem to question O'Neill's holding.
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flawed. 03 The irony here is that the much maligned ESA and its critics'
favored water laws are very much alike in several significant ways.
A. Similarities in Their Basic Provisions
Some of the similarities between the Act and western water law
arise from the basic provisions of the laws themselves -which, as
explained below, often differ significantly from the actual implementation of these laws.1°4 The following pages identify three similarities that
stem primarily from the text of the ESA and the water laws.
1. Both Seem to Provide Nearly Absolute Protectionfor One Interest
The first basic similarity between western water law and the
ESA is that each provides exceptional legal protection for a single
interest. Western water law provides almost total security for water
users with appropriative rights, while the ESA appears to do the same
for threatened and endangered species.
The ESA has been famous for its strong protection of imperiled
fish and wildlife ever since TVA v. Hill, where the Supreme Court found
"beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be
afforded the highest of priorities." 0 5 It is "the unparalleled stringency of
the ESA's provisions," say commentators, that make it "the most revered
10 6
and reviled of federal environmental laws."
The Act's reputation for single-minded toughness is based on
two sweeping prohibitions. First, the ESA forbids any person from
taking (or causing the take of) any endangered animal. 107 Second, as the
Supreme Court noted in TVA v. Hill, the Act "affirmatively command[s]
all federal agencies 'to insure that action authorized,funded, or carried out
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence' of an endangered
species or 'result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species....,,108 These provisions seem to protect rare fish and wildlife
from virtually any kind of harm caused by any person, anywhere in the
United States, regardless of the economic costs or other human impacts
that may result from such protection. The common portrayal of ESA
103. See, e.g., Senate Comm. ESA Hearing, supra note 5; Idaho Governor Dirk
Kempthorne, Address to the Idaho Water Users Association, Sun Valley, Idaho, June 23,
2003 (on file with author).
104. See infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text.
105. 437 U.S. 153,174 (1978).
106. JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 117 (2002).

107.
108.

16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
437 U.S. 153, 173, citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (emphasis supplied by Court).
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court cases or agency actions as favoring "worthless" species over
human activities' °9 reinforces the popular perception that a draconian
Act rigidly protects critters and gives no regard to people.
Western water law provides similarly strong protection to those
who hold water rights. As discussed above," 0 appropriators who divert
water and apply it to beneficial use obtain water rights that last forever,
so long as they are used. Though the water itself is by law a public
resource and water rights provide only a right of use, these rights are
considered private property. And because the water laws provide few if
any environmental restrictions to limit the exercise of these rights, a
water user may legally withdraw the last drops of water from a stream,
unless that water is needed downstream to satisfy an older water right.
While water rights ensure solid legal protection for established
water users, in practice these users often enjoy even greater security than
their water rights seem to confer. For example, "waste" (excessive or
non-beneficial water use) is universally outlawed in the West, but the
states rarely take action to curtail an established use or require greater
efficiency;"' to the contrary, most water right holders in the West are not
even required to measure their use." 2 Some states have bent, revised, or

109.

As stated by one commentator,
Newspapers carry tales of federal zealots seizing farm equipment from
unwitting farmers, homeowners barred from saving their property from
wildfire because of brush clearing restrictions, and businesses losing
decades of investment-all because of an endangered species. A typical
news article attacking the ESA begins: "Would you spend $2.6 million on a
cockroach? The federal government does." This opening salvo is followed
by a scathing review of the "tremendous economic damage" being done to
citizens on behalf of a rat, mouse, mole, tortoise, or other lowly and
contemptible creature whose earthly purpose cannot be fathomed,
especially when measured against economic progress and personal
freedom.
Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning:Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered
Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 279-80 (1998) (citations omitted).
110. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
111. Commentators have noted that state water agencies do not aggressively apply the
classic prior appropriation requirement of "beneficial use without waste":
[A]s to existing users, agencies play a largely passive role. They do not
seek out wasteful practices for active enforcement. Occasionally,
particularly egregious practices may be routed out,... [but] these practices
usually come to an agency's attention by way of complaint rather than
through their own investigations. Agencies simply do not actively seek to
define and enforce against waste or inefficient water use.
Neuman, supra note 39, at 961; see also Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest:
Eliminating Waste as a Way of Restoring Streamfiows, 27 ENVTL. L. 151 (1997).
112. Neuman, supra note 39, at 986.
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ignored the traditional water law rules in order to allow established uses
3
to continue unchanged."
2. Neither Law Seeks to Balance Economic and Environmental Values
A second similarity between western water law and the ESA,
closely related to the first, is that these laws largely reject the common
approach of balancing economic and environmental interests. To the
contrary, each offers little consideration of the other's values: western
water law largely ignores environmental concerns, and the ESA as
written gives little regard to economic concerns.
The ESA protects threatened and endangered species while
giving remarkably little consideration to economic factors. Although
nearly all other federal environmental laws call for some consideration of
economic costs in determining the appropriate level of environmental
protection, 1 4 the ESA generally offers full protection to rare species
regardless of economics. As the Supreme Court stated, literally every
section of the Act reflects "[t]he plain intent of Congress... to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."

n5

Federal agencies are not to consider economics in determining
whether to list a species as threatened or endangered.1 6 Nor does the
Act consider economics during the section 7 consultation process: a
jeopardy opinion may still halt a proposed federal action regardless of
the resulting economic impacts." 7 (In issuing a jeopardy opinion,
however, the Service is to suggest any "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" to the proposed action that would avoid jeopardy, 118 and
113. Summarizing this practice in the Pacific Northwest states, I earlier noted that the
states often effectively waive the traditional rules of prior appropriation where they
threaten to curtail established water uses. States have routinely bent, changed, or ignored
the traditional rules, through action or inaction, in order to maintain such uses. As a
practical matter, water management in the region today is based less on strict prior
appropriation principles than on protection of the status quo, that is, preservation of the
water use practices, legal or not, that have become established in an area.
See Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the
PacificNorthwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation,28 ENVTL. L. 881, 888 (1998).
114. Of the many federal laws governing hazardous substances in the environment,
"the overwhelming majority of statutes employ a balancing test of some sort, requiring that
regulations balance the economic and social costs of controls against the health and safety
benefits of regulation." THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 439

(4th ed. 2002).
115. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (emphasis added).
116. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
117. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 174 (The Court's "view of the Act will produce results
requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many millions of
dollars in public funds.").
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000).

Winter 2004]

WESTERN WATER LAW& THE ESA

Interior Department rules define these alternatives as being
"economically and technologically feasible." 119) While the Act allows the
Cabinet-level "God Squad" to consider economics, 120 in routine ESA
administration, the agencies are not to consider economics except for
121
determining critical habitat for listed species.
In the same vein, western water law gives little real consideration to environmental values, especially where established water rights
are concerned. Water right holders legally may, and commonly do, dry
up streams completely when their cumulative demands exceed the
available supply of water. 122 As noted above, western water law
traditionally refused to protect water flowing in its natural course,
requiring a diversion of water to establish an appropriative right. Even
today, instream flow protections -that is, legal mechanisms that protect
water flowing in its natural course -provide limited benefits for fish and
wildlife in the West because several states have few if any such
protections, and those protections that do exist have junior priorities that
fail to ensure sufficient flows for quality habitat.123 Nor do the western
states take legal or regulatory action against existing water users for
purposes of protecting aquatic ecosystems. 24 As a practical matter,
established water rights are immune from regulation by the states for
25
purposes of protecting the environment.
119. 50 CFR § 402.02 (2002).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (2000).
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000). The agencies might also consider costs in determining
whether an HCP will minimize impacts on listed species "to the maximum extent
practicable." See Barton H. Thompson, Conservation Options: Toward a GreaterPrivate Role, 21
VA. ENvTL. L.J. 245, 269 (2002).
122. Authors of a leading book on this subject provided a partial list of some the West's
larger, drier rivers:
Some of the West's major watercourses that are not dry or virtually dry
during substantial portions of the year include the Snake River below
Milner Dam in Idaho, the Gila River and, below Theodore Roosevelt Dam,
the Salt River in Arizona; the Powder River in Oregon; the Arkansas River
near the Colorado-Kansas border; the Rio Grande River below Elephant
Butte Reservoir in New Mexico; and the San Joaquin River below Friant
Dam in California.
GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 26 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 144.
124. See Neuman, supra note 39, at 953-56; Benson, supra note 113, at 903-06.
125. Recent experience from the State of Washington illustrates this point. The
Washington Department of Ecology has occasionally used its authority under Clean Water
Act section 401 to impose minimum flow conditions on hydroelectric projects. The U.S.
Supreme Court upheld such actions in PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711-21 (1994). Recently, the Washington Supreme Court
upheld Ecology's authority to impose such conditions on hydro projects even if they have
valid water rights under state law. PUD No. 1 of Pend Oreille County v. Dep't of Ecology,
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In recent years most western states have allowed environmental
concerns to be considered when granting new water rights. Most state
water agencies have legal authority to deny a proposed water use if it
would be contrary to the public interest. 126 However, the practical
environmental significance of this authority is doubtful for several
reasons. First, most western state water agencies make little use of their
127
power to reject new water rights based on environmental concerns.
Second, because many areas of the West are already fully appropriated,
there is little or no water available for new uses. 128 Thus, in many areas
there are few applications for new water rights. Finally, Colorado which practices western water law in its purest and most traditional
form-still allows no public interest consideration as to new
29
appropriations.1
Given the limited role for competing values in these laws, it
makes news when endangered species protections officially yield to
economic considerations, or when appropriative water rights are cut
back to serve environmental values. 130 The California Supreme Court's
51 P.3d 744, 758-66 (Wash. 2002). The Washington Legislature quickly passed legislation
that preserves this authority as to hydro projects but otherwise prohibits Ecology from
exercising water quality authority in a way that would "abrogate, supersede, impair, or
condition the ability of a water right holder to fully divert or withdraw water." S.B. 5028,
58th Leg., 2003 1st Special Sess. (Wash. 2003). Thus, the new law ensures that clean-water
laws will not affect water users (other than hydro projects) or their water rights.
126. Getches, supra note 35, at 33.
127. "Application of the laws [prior to the 1990s] was uneven among states, however,
and rarely was forceful enough to protect social and environmental values... .Some public
interest review was no more than a cursory determination by the state engineer." Id.
(citations omitted). "States have done virtually nothing in recent years to improve public
interest review of water decisions. Indeed, some states have taken steps backward." Id. at
35 (citations omitted).
128. "The entire flow of many rivers has been legally claimed since the turn of the
[twentieth] century, or even before... Depleted or nonexistent flows in river channels are a
fact of life throughout much of the West." GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 26.
129. The Colorado Supreme Court has refused to allow the Colorado water courts to
consider environmental factors without express statutory authorization: "Although
environmental factors might provide a reasonable and sound basis for altering existing
law, we have previously held: 'If a change in long established judicial precedent is
desirable, it is a legislative and not a judicial function to make any needed change."' Bd. of
County Comm'rs of the County of Arapahoe v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo.
1995).
130. Although the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's veto of a federal permit for
the Two Forks Dam did not actually affect Denver's well established water rights for the
project, the veto effectively blocked the project despite these state-law water rights. This
result was so extraordinary that some people proclaimed prior appropriation dead, as
noted in a wonderfully evocative (and provocative) obituary by a leading commentator.
Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v, xvi
(1991). Needless to say, reports of prior appropriation's death were greatly exaggerated.
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decision in the Mono Lake litigation, holding that the public trust
doctrine could effectively reduce Los Angeles's existing water rights,
was a dramatic but very rare exception involving water laws. 131 By the
same token, the ESA God Squad-the cabinet-level committee with the
exclusive authority to allow a federal agency action to cause jeopardy to
a listed species -has only granted two exemptions allowing jeopardy in
2
0-plus years and has not been convened since the Northern spotted owl
13 2
controversy of the early 1990s.
3. Both Laws Protect the Status Quo Better Than They Providefor the Future
One of the most striking similarities between western water law
and the ESA is that both laws work best in preserving the status quothat is, in preventing changes that would adversely affect the interests
they protect. Thus, the ESA has been most effective in preventing
extinction, largely by limiting new activities (especially on federal lands)
that could cause harm to endangered species or their habitat. Similarly,
western water law does best ensuring that existing users continue to
receive their accustomed water by giving users perpetual water rights
and protecting them from being adversely affected by changed
conditions. Conversely, neither law does well in providing for the future:
the ESA has had limited success in rebuilding populations of imperiled
species, while western water law often fails to ensure that water is
reliably available for new demands.
The basic rules of prior appropriation effectively lock in
established water uses and allow them to continue without change. As
noted above, water rights last forever, and their terms are rarely
amended to reflect changed conditions. Moreover, nearly all water rights
are limited to a particular type of use, point of diversion, and location of
use. These fixed aspects of a water right may be changed, but only with
prior state approval and only if the state determines, after an
adjudicatory hearing or other proceedings, that the proposed change
would not harm other water users. 133 Thus, the law ensures that water
users on a particular stream will be protected from changed conditions,
131. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 727-32
(Cal. 1983). Outside of California, the Public Trust Doctrine has not had much practical
effect on western water law or water rights, with the exception of a recent case from
Hawaii. In re Water Use Permit Applications, Petitions for Interim Instream Flow Standard
Amendments, and Petitions for Water Reservations for Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 444-55
(Haw. 2000). Idaho, by contrast, has legislatively barred the public trust doctrine from
applying to water rights. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public Trust: An
Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461,472-76 (1997).
132. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 106, at 211.
133. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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even if one or more of their fellow users transfers their water to another
place or purpose of use. Taken together, these fundamental features of
appropriation law powerfully preserve the water use status quo.
In practice, established water uses are even more firmly
anchored in concrete than these basic rules might suggest. States have
not actively enforced some of these rules, such as the requirement of
"use it or lose it" or the prohibition against water waste, 134 allowing
water users to maintain their existing water rights and practices despite
the letter of the law. States have not actively enforced the traditional
rules, and have even changed them where they appeared to pose a threat
to established water uses. 135 And water right changes (transfers), while
providing a legal means to shift water from "old" uses to "new," have
not resulted in large-scale movements of water out of irrigation, except
in a few places.1 36 Despite the region's enormous population growth and
economic change over the past 30 years, today agriculture still accounts
137
for more than 80 percent of water diversions in the West - more than
13
90 percent in some states. 8
Most western states have the authority to conduct water
resources planning, but they have rarely used this authority to take
serious steps toward anticipating and resolving future water
problems. 39 Water policy in the West has typically been reactive in
See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
As noted in an earlier writing,
Despite the pressures of population growth, environmental restoration,
and economic transformation, established water uses have remained
solidly protected in the Northwest... .The record clearly shows that the
states have been extremely reluctant to implement the traditional rules of
western water law if doing so would mean upsetting the water use status
quo.
Benson, supra note 113, at 916.
136. According to a publication that closely tracks water transactions in the West, the
Colorado-Big Thompson (CBT) Project on the Colorado Front Range "is the only market
where water rights are traded widely and competitively." Water Market Indicators, WATER
STRATEGIST, Apr. 2003, at 7. In 2002, Colorado had 123 water transactions, of which 110
involved CBT shares. All the other western states combined had fewer than 80 transactions.
There does appear to be an upward trend in transactions, however, from an average of 144
transactions in 1996-1998 to an average of 199 transactions in 1999-2002. See Annual
Transaction Review, WATER STRATEGIST, Feb. 2003, at 10, 15.
137. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
138. As of 1995, irrigation and livestock accounted for more than 90 percent of water
withdrawals in four western states: Colorado, at 92 percent; Wyoming, at 94 percent; Idaho,
at 96 percent; and Montana, at 97 percent. See SOLLEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 11.
139. Professor Getches has summarized states' recent water planning history as follows:
During the 1980s a few states had planning processes that attempted to
integrate water supply, quality, and other related issues such as
environmental protection and flood control. Presumably, planning
134.
135.
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nature, responding to short-term crises such as drought and flood but
largely failing to address long-term challenges such as population
growth, unsatisfied water demands for ecological purposes, and climate
40
change.
The ESA is similarly reactive, taking effect only after a species
has declined to the point of being threatened with extinction. Only after
a species has been listed as threatened or endangered does it enjoy any
official ESA protection. 141 The Act is simply not designed to keep species
off the protected lists by maintaining healthy, viable populations or the
142
habitat needed to sustain such populations.
While it has commonly been criticized for failing to recover
many species, the ESA has apparently been effective in preserving their
tenuous existence. A 1995 National Academy of Sciences report
concluded,
Although it is impossible to quantify the ESA's biological
effects-i.e., how well it has prevented species from
becoming extinct-the committee concludes that fewer
continued during the 1990s in those states, though it is not revealed by our
survey of legislation and court decisions. The majority of western states
had no water planning programs or limited their planning to supply
issues, and they did not make their planning any more comprehensive
during the 1990s. To the extent that states addressed the subject, they deal
with piecemeal planning to address specific issues such as groundwater,
conservation, or drought.
Getches, supra note 35, at 38 (citations omitted).
140. The U.S. Department of Interior has launched an effort it calls "Water 2025" in
order to prompt a more forward-looking water policy for the West. WATER 2025:
PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST, at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/
Water2025.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). It remains to be seen how successful this effort
will be, however. See Reed D. Benson, The Interior Department's Water 2025: Blueprint for
Balance, or Just Better Business as Usual?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,837 (2003).
141. The closest the ESA comes to protecting not-yet-listed species is to require a federal
agency to confer with the relevant Service before taking any action that could cause
jeopardy to a species proposed for listing but not yet listed. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (2000).
Recently, however, the Services have established something called a "Candidate
Conservation Agreement with Assurances," analogous to an incidental take permit and
HCP for species that are in peril but have not yet been listed under the ESA. 50 C.F.R. §
17.22(d) (2002). See Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act
Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 288-90
(1998) (noting that these agreements are largely intended to avoid ESA listing, but that
"many of these agreements contain more wishful thinking than concrete solutions to the
causes of species endangerment").
142. One of the common criticisms of the ESA is that it kicks in too late -that is not
"until a species has declined to the point where heroic efforts are often needed to rescue it.
However, it would require a whole new approach to the biodiversity problem, a true
ecosystems protection law, to address the prevention issue." Parenteau, supra note 141, at
278.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

species have become extinct than would have without the
ESA. In other words, the ESA has successfully prevented
of the ESA
some species from becoming extinct. Retention
143
would help to prevent species extinction.
Once it kicks in, the ESA is most effective in restricting,
modifying, and occasionally stopping new actions, and thus maintaining
the status quo. This effectiveness arises from the two broad prohibitions
discussed above: no federal agency may take any action that jeopardizes
a listed species or adversely alters its critical habitat, and no person may
take (kill or harm) a listed animal either directly or by destroying its
habitat.'" While the Act has also been applied to ongoing activities
145
it has
where a federal agency has some discretionary control,
traditionally been best at limiting new activities-for example, new
logging or land development projects - that might impact a listed species
or its habitat.
While the ESA does have provisions that call for a more
proactive approach to species conservation, they have not been
particularly effective. Section 7(a)(1) imposes a duty on all federal
146
agencies to use their authorities to conserve listed species. Most courts,
however, have found that agencies satisfy this requirement if they
provide any sort of program that could benefit species; rarely has a court
found that agency actions violate the ESA's affirmative duty to
conserve. 147 The Act also requires the Services to develop recovery plans

143. Committee on Scientific Issues in the Endangered Species Act, National Research
Council, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACr 11 (1995). The report also stated,
Although not conclusive, the comparison of rates of extinction between
listed and candidate species, especially when remedial actions are clearly
identifiable and feasible, indicates that the ESA helps to retard extinctions.
Recovery actions encouraged by the ESA and supported by agency
funding have helped to rescue several species from precarious
status... .Without the protections and recovery actions required by the
ESA, there is a strong, but hard-to-prove, possibility that most, if not all, of
these species would be closer to extinction than they are today.
Id. at 156.
144. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1127-31 (10th Cir.
2003); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053-56 (9th Cir. 1994).
146. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000).
147. See Oregon Natural Res. Council Fund v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civil No.
00-431-JO, 2003 WL 117999, at *3-5 (D. Or. Jan. 2, 2003); Strahan v. Linnon, 187 F.3d 623,
1998 WL 1085817, at *2 (1st Cir. 1998); but see Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 618 (5th
Cir. 1998) (finding that the Department of Agriculture had violated section 7(a)(1)).
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for endangered species. 148 ESA recovery planning has been ineffective in
practice, however, because the plans tend to be substantively inadequate,
poorly implemented, and largely unenforceable. 149 Not surprisingly, the
ESA has not rebuilt healthy populations of very many species, although
150
there certainly have been some success stories.
The ESA has had some success in preserving what is left of a
species' habitat, and the same can be said of the water laws in those
states that have effective programs for protecting instream flows. For
many aquatic species, however, habitat restoration is deemed necessary
for their recovery, if not their very survival.' 5' Neither prior
appropriation nor the ESA was designed primarily for this purpose,
however, and both have a poor track record in habitat restoration.

148. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (2000). The Act requires the relevant Service to develop a
recovery plan for each listed species unless it "finds that such a plan will not promote the
conservation of the species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(1) (2000).
149. As stated in a leading article on recovery planning, although the ESA provides
that recovery or conservation of protected species and the ecosystems on
which they depend is the central purpose of the Act, and USFWS informs
us that "recovery planning under section 4(f) of the Act is the 'umbrella'
that eventually guides all [Endangered Species Act] activities and
promotes a species' conservation and eventual delisting," the recovery
planning section and the concept of recovery it embodies have played an
insignificantrole in the legal protection of endangered and threatened species. The
same agency that declares recovery planning the umbrella that eventually
guides all activities also tells us that recovery plans are "guidance
documents" and not "decision-making" documents. Although recovery
plans are required by law to identify specific recovery actions and a
specific time frame for implementing them, the agencies and courts agree
that these "implementation schedules" are unenforceable. In 1993,
researchers at the University of Idaho announced findings indicating that
recovery plans for many species prescribed "management for extinction"
rather than management for recovery by setting recovery goals so low that
they could not significantly increase the chance of species survival.
Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species
Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 26-27 (1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
150. Parenteau, supra note 141, at 274-77.
151. See Moore et al., supra note 28, at 329-39. A dramatic example is the endangered
Rio Grande silvery minnow, once a common and wide-ranging species but now in grave
peril of extinction as it occupies only a small reach of the Rio Grande that is commonly left
with little or no flow due to agricultural and municipal water diversions. Sean O'Connor,
The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and the Endangered Species Act, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673, 67677, 681-85 (2002).
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B. Similarities in the Implementation of Western Water Law and the
ESA
Some of the most important similarities between the Act and
western water laws stem from the practical application of these laws by
the responsible agencies and other interested parties rather than from the
text of the laws themselves. The following four similarities arise from the
way these laws are implemented.
1. Both Are Typically More Restrictive on Paper Than in Practice
Experience has shown that implementation of both the water
laws and the ESA is often very different from the black-letter law. As
commonly applied, neither law is nearly so restrictive as its basic
provisions would suggest.
Several commentators have noted that water managers in the
West often do not actively apply many of the traditional tenets of prior
appropriation, resulting in a situation where water allocation and
management diverge greatly from the "rules." For example, Professor
Neuman has documented the western states' failure to meaningfully
implement the time-honored requirement of "beneficial use without
waste." 152 Another longstanding prior appropriation rule, "use it or lose
it," is also rarely enforced. 153 As Professor Leshy has stated, contrary to
the myth of clear property rights and strong state management of water
use, "[tihe reality is that (with some exceptions and variations in
particular places), state water allocation and administration tolerates a
rather amazing level of data gaps, imprecision, illegal uses, conflicting
154
Professor Tarlock
claims to the same water, and other shortcomings."
has observed that states commonly do not actively enforce water right
priorities-that is, they do not shut off junior users to ensure adequate

Neuman, supra note 39, at 923-62.
In the words of another observer,
Several commentators have observed that western water law theory
clearly envisions the loss of water rights and also plac[es] limitations on
the use of such rights to only the quantities necessary for beneficial use. In
practice, though, once a water right is obtained, there is little method or
means for enforcement of any provision or limitation.
Fred R. Disheroon, New Directions in Western Water Law as to Loss of Water Rights by
Forfeiture,Abandonment, or Lack of Perfection, 159, 160, in WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995).
154. John D. Leshy, Address to the Am. Bar Ass'n Water Law Conference, Feb. 20, 2003.
152.
153.
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water supplies to seniors-causing "a substantial gap between the
155
formal and the actual practice of prior appropriation."
In an earlier article, I argued that protection of established water
users, rather than prior appropriation, was the practical modern rule for
water allocation and management. 5 6 I found that the states' failure to
enforce traditional water law principles against existing users was not
simply a result of bureaucratic inertia or lack of agency resources. In
many cases, the states had actually bent or changed the traditional rules
in order to limit any possible adverse effects on established water
users.157 In other words, the traditional legal rules were more restrictive
of existing water uses than the states' actual practice, and, in some cases,
the states changed their rules to ensure that result.
In the same vein, several commentators have shown that, in
practice, the ESA rarely delivers the tough, uncompromising protection
that it seems to provide on paper. Professor Houck made this point a
decade ago after extensively analyzing the Services' implementation of
several key provisions of the ESA, including those relating to listing,
critical habitat, and consultation. 158 More recently, Professor Parenteau
evaluated the Services' overall implementation of the Act and reached
the same conclusion: "On paper, the ESA looks like... the strongest
wildlife protection law in the world. In reality, however, the ESA turns
out to be not so formidable, a statute that operates, as will be seen, on a

155. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 769, 771 (2001). Tarlock argues that priority enforcement decreased largely
because reservoir storage increased the reliability of water rights in many areas, thus
reducing the importance of priority enforcement:
Dams made it increasingly unnecessary to enforce water rights in the
rigorous manner that the doctrine suggests and helped produce the
culture of non-enforcement of the beneficial use doctrine. The threat of
priority enforcement decreased substantially. Water rights became more of
a general water entitlement to use water rather than the right to a specific
quantity used in a non-wasteful manner as specified in the formal
doctrine. As a result, prior appropriation became more and more of a
shadow doctrine.
Id. (citation omitted)
156. Benson, supra note 113. While my earlier article focused specifically on the states of
the Pacific Northwest, I believe the other western states all take the same approach to a
greater or lesser degree.
157. Id. at 895-99.
158. "The Endangered Species Act is not what it seems-either in the media or in the
United States Code. It has, in effect, been substantially amended through regulations and
practice, transforming it from an act of specific requirements into a more discretionary
permit system." Oliver Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interiorand Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 358 (1993).
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philosophy of compromise and accommodation, relying more on
159
mitigation than prohibition."
The federal government has tried to implement the ESA in a way
that minimizes its economic and political consequences and has
commonly looked for every bit of "flexibility" that the Act might provide
in allowing activities to move forward without tough restrictions. After
an extensive study of recent ESA consultations regarding salmon in the
Pacific Northwest, Professor Blumm determined that the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) had consistently shortchanged the
biological needs of listed salmon due to economic and political
concerns: 60 "Perhaps the chief lesson from this study is that the ESA
affords NMFS sufficient authority to resolve scientific uncertainties in a
way that allows the pursuit of the politically palatable, instead of the
biologically necessary." 161 Moreover, the Clinton Administration made
several user-friendly ESA programmatic changes -including major
revisions to the HCP program to offer a better deal for private
landowners- despite serious criticism that these policies were
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Act. 162 The Services' day-today decisions and policy choices to avoid economic impacts and political
controversy have resulted in an ESA whose legal bark is far more serious
than its practical bite.
2. Neither Provides Positive Incentives for Resource Stewardship
Both the ESA and western water law establish rules for the
management of natural resources that are valuable and scarce-rare
species and fresh water. Maximum effectiveness would seem to require a
"carrot and stick" approach, with both positive incentives and
enforceable controls to promote conservation of these resources.
Unfortunately, neither law does well in this area. Both the ESA and
Parenteau, supra note 141, at 266.
Blumm and Corbin state,
A widespread complaint about the ESA is that the statute emphasizes
species protection to the exclusion of economic considerations. The
decisions studied in this Article seriously question the accuracy of those
allegations. For example, in the numerous eleventh-hour compromises
that NMFS made in formulating the 1995-99 BiOp on hydroelectric
operations, none favored salmon.
Blumm & Corbin, supra note 21, at 598-99 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 602.
162. See Parenteau, supra note 141, at 284-300; Sheldon, supra note 109, at 308-37.
Clinton Administration officials defended these initiatives as both politically pragmatic and
practically beneficial for species protection. See Donald J. Barry, Opportunity in the Face of
Danger: The Pragmatic Development of Habitat Conservation Plans, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
159.
160.

ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 129, 130-33 (1998).
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western water law have been criticized for providing poor incentives for
resource stewardship.
Commentators have long contended that prior appropriation as
practiced in the West provides incentives to waste water, not conserve
it.163 Because water rights may be lost through abandonment or
forfeiture to the extent that they are not used for several consecutive
years, users have an incentive to ensure that they regularly make full use
of their water rights, even if these rights substantially exceed their actual
needs. 164 Moreover, the more water a user actually diverts and
consumes, the more water is generally available to be transferred to a
new place or purpose of use 165 and, thus, the more valuable the water
right will be. In those parts of the West where growing cities are facing
water supply shortages that could be addressed by leasing or purchasing
agricultural water rights, irrigators may have a particularly strong
incentive to maximize their use of water and thereby increase the future
value of their water rights.

163.

As stated in a leading article on this subject,
The anti-waste component of the beneficial use doctrine was intended to
spread scarce water to many users, but... [it] has not been particularly
effective at maximizing the use of water. The doctrine certainly encourages
diversion and use - indeed, overuse - of water. In this sense, beneficial use
has been instrumental in supporting and encouraging economic
development and settlement of the arid West. But because the concept of
waste is so generous and poorly defined, and because forfeiture is not
aggressively enforced, the doctrine does not even begin to maximize the
number of users who could be supported by a given amount of water....In
short, the doctrine, as it has been implemented and interpreted, simply is
not an efficiency-seeking doctrine. The existing beneficial use doctrine fails
miserably at encouraging users to accomplish their use with a minimum of
water.
Neuman, supra note 39, at 975 (emphasis added).
164. In the words of Professors Tarlock, Corbridge, and Getches,
Theoretically, every water user operates under a threat that a water use
can be challenged as wasteful and thereby held to be in excess of a decreed
appropriative right. A successful challenge would result in more water
being left in the stream for the benefit of junior appropriators. Such
challenges have been rare, and successes even rarer. A more seriously
perceived threat is from non-use. Appropriators have operated under the
specter of "use it or lose it," not "use it efficiently or lose it." Thus, far
greater quantities of water than are needed to fulfill particular purposes
have been diverted in the false hope of protecting rights to use quantities
of water awarded in permits or decrees.
TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 22, at 178. In reality, the "use it or lose it" provisions of western
water law are not actively enforced either, but water users evidently feel it is better to be
safe than sorry.
165. See, e.g., City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 58-59 (Colo. 1968).
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These anti-conservation incentives might be less problematic if
western water law provided an effective "stick" to deter excessive use,
but in practice it does not. As noted above, most water right holders are
not even required to measure how much they use, and the states do not
1 66
enforce the longstanding prohibition against wasteful water use.
Moreover, the western states charge nothing for the right to use their
public water resources, 167 even though user fees certainly could help
1 68
reduce water demand.
Similarly, the ESA has also been frequently criticized for its poor
incentives, especially where private landowners are concerned. 169 The
ESA prohibits any person from causing a take of a protected animal, and,
170
since some forms of habitat destruction may be considered take,
private owners whose lands offer habitat for listed species potentially
face restrictions on use of their lands. Thus, private landowners have
sometimes logged, plowed, or otherwise altered their property in an
effort to eliminate listed species or keep them away.171 Some have argued
166. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
167. To my knowledge, Arizona (under its pathbreaking Groundwater Management
Act) is the only western state that charges any fee for use of its waters. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§§ 45-611-616.
168. "Fees or taxes on water use can internalize the opportunity cost of removing the
water from the stream and, in the case of federal reclamation water, offset the sizable
federal subsidies that currently encourage excessive use." Thompson, supra note 121, at 297.
169. As stated by one leading commentator,
Uncompensated regulation under section 9 of the ESA also encourages
overinvestment in land use. Because section 9 limits modification of an
endangered species' habitat, property owners can avoid the section 9
prohibition by ensuring that their land is not viable habitat. Nothing
prevents a property owner from destroying habitat prior to the listing of a
species, and nothing requires a property owner to allow his land to
become viable habitat after a listing. Although it is illegal, a property
owner who destroys habitat on her property after a listing but before the
government surveys the area can also escape section 9's grasp.
Barton H. Thompson, The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49
STAN. L. REV. 305, 351 (1997); see also Robert Innes et al., Takings, Compensation and
Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 35, 39 (1998).
170. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
171. Professor Thompson notes,
Stories are legion of property owners evading the ESA by cutting down
trees, repeatedly plowing their fields, or otherwise altering their land's
ecology to make it unappealing to listed species in the region. There is no
reliable estimate of such evasive tactics. The government does not monitor
such behavior which, in most cases, is not illegal....Yet reports by property
owners (who, ironically, have an incentive to overstate its occurrence), as
well as by environmental advocates and governmental officials (who in
today's political environment do not), suggest that such practices are not
isolated exceptions.
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that the Act even pushes private landowners to resort to an extreme form
of self-help against listed species: "shoot, shovel, and shut-up." 172
Here again, these perverse incentives might be less troublesome
(at least from the endangered species' standpoint) if the ESA enforcement program on private lands was highly effective in protecting listed
species and their habitat. But here again, the regulatory "stick" does not
go all that far in ensuring compliance. For one thing, habitat destruction
is illegal only after a species is listed, and only if it causes actual harm to
a member of a listed species. 173 The federal government rarely enforces
the take prohibition,174 and there have been few ESA citizen suits filed
against non-governmental actors alleging a take on private lands. 175
Recently, however, a federal court in Idaho found a take by an irrigator
whose diversion was shown to harm threatened bull trout' 76 demonstrating that private water users are not immune from ESA
liability simply because they hold state-law water rights, even though
they are rarely faced with ESA enforcement.

Thompson, supra note 169.
172. Id.; Innes et al., supra note 169.
173. ESA regulations define "harm" in this context as "an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002); see Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See also 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2002) (Department of Commerce definition).
174. As stated in 1998 by a longtime federal official, the self-described "Forrest Gump"
of the ESA,
You can probably count on two hands the number of prosecutions, either
civilly or criminally, that have been brought by the federal government
over the last 23 years because of an alleged take on private lands. So to
that extent, it's not been a readily and frequently utilized tool. And in fact
we've had the loss of thousands and thousands of acres of endangered
and threatened species habitat in the interim.
Barry, supra note 162, at 130.
175. Environmental plaintiffs often would rather sue state or local governments for
permitting private actors to engage in actions that cause take rather than sue the private
actors themselves. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) (state lobster fishing
permitting program); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F.
Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (county ordinance allowing vehicles onto beach); Pac. Rivers
Council v. Brown, No. CV-02-243-BR, 2003 WL 21087974 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2003) (state
logging approval program).
176. Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, Civ. No. 00-0730-E-BLW (D. Idaho, Nov. 14,
2002).
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3. Both Laws Have Produced Their Share of Litigation
One of the most common complaints of ESA critics is that the
Act has generated an excessive amount of litigation. 177 For example, in a
recent speech, Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne's most pointed
criticism of the ESA was the following:
I can tell you where the ESA has found success... and that is
in creating litigation, controversy and conflict. Rarely do
we hear about an endangered species without there being a
lawsuit involved. And while it's great for the attorneys,
litigation rarely helps the species. Too often, money that
could otherwise be used for on the ground habitat
restoration and recovery projects is siphoned away to pay
for seemingly endless legal battles. Unfortunately, the ESA
too often leads to conflict, when instead it should lead to
178
cooperation, conservation and recovery of the species.
While the ESA has, indeed, produced a number of major court battles,
the same is certainly true of western water law.
A key provision of the ESA is section 11(g), which authorizes
,any person" to sue to enforce the Act. 179 This citizen suit provision is

177. In his recent remarks at a congressional hearing, Senator Pete Domenici bitterly
criticized the Rio Grande ESA litigation and the recent decision in Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003): "Now, four years after the section 7
consultation litigation was brought, millions of dollars have been spent and the court case
drags on... .Mr. Chairman, the ESA, long-driven [sic] by litigation, is in dire need of
reform." Senate Comm. ESA Hearing, supra note 5; House Resources Committee Chairman
Richard Pombo made the following remarks on ESA citizen suits to force designations of
critical habitat:
These frivolous, politically-motivated lawsuits have already bankrupted
the critical habitat program. Those who file them are less interested in
actual species recovery than they are in lining their own pockets with
taxpayer dollars... .Taxpayer dollars should be spent recovering
endangered species, not on sushi dinners and Armani suits for these socalled activists.
Press Release, Rep. Richard Pombo, Radical Environmental Lawyers Trump Experts,
Abuse Law Again (June 3, 2003).
178. Kempthorne, supra note 103. ESA supporters would surely disagree that litigation
rarely helps the species, particularly since many species would not have been designated as
threatened or endangered without it. Notable examples of aquatic species listed due to
citizen litigation include the bull trout, see Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. 1388, 1400-01 (D. Or. 1996), and the Oregon Coast stock of
Coho salmon, see Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1160-61 (D. Or.
1998).
179. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
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similar to those of the other major federal environmental laws 180 in that it
allows suits against both federal agencies and private parties who violate
the Act but requires prospective plaintiffs to give 60 days' notice before
filing to provide time to cure the violation. By allowing citizens to sue in
cases where the government is unwilling or unable to act, Congress
intended to provide an additional measure of protection for threatened
and endangered species. As the Supreme Court noted, "the obvious
purpose of the particular provision in question is to encourage
enforcement by so-called 'private attorneys general'... .181
While the ESA has generated its share of litigation, this litigation
often seems to receive more than its share of media attention. There
would seem to be two obvious reasons for the media's fascination with
ESA cases. First, some of these are classic "man bites dog" cases. The
Snail darter case of TVA v. Hill 8s 2 provides a perfect example: dams kill
fish every minute of every day, but when a tiny fish kills a big dam,
that's news. Second, ESA cases sometimes force a reluctant government
to take an action that adversely affects a powerful interest, causing a
loud outcry. Court decisions on the Klamath in 2001 and the Rio Grande
in 2003, effectively forcing the Bureau of Reclamation to release more
water for fish in a time of drought, each triggered a mediagenic storm of
1 83
political and ideological conflict.
It is true that the ESA is a preferred legal tool for conservation
groups, and ESA litigation is commonly perceived as a way for
environmentalists to pursue their goals. Increasingly, however, economic
interests are suing to challenge ESA actions.1l 4 In a case involving
180. See, e.g., section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); section 304 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); section 310 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000).
181. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).
182. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
183. Following the Tenth Circuit's decision in the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow case,
Albuquerque Mayor Martin Chavez offered these vitriolic remarks:
[T]he fringe environmental community, with the assistance of two federal
judges who are accountable to nobody in our society, who are not elected,
who hide behind their nice robes and tall desks, now want to put the
future of this community in jeopardy... The fringe environmental
community, which wants to take away this city's destiny, wants to take
water from the mouths of our children, will not prevail, not as long as I am
in office.
Ruling for Minnow Churns City, State, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., June 13, 2003, at 1; see also Jehl,
supra note 8.
184. See, e.g., Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001)
(challenging listing decision); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (challenging designation of critical habitat); Kandra v. United
States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001) (challenging biological opinion).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

Klamath Basin water use, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the irrigator
plaintiffs had standing to sue under the ESA.185 But the converse
typically does not hold true: environmentalists have a very hard time
pursuing their goals in water rights litigation, 186 especially in general
adjudications. 87 This difficulty is not for lack of litigation opportunity.
While it generally receives little popular attention, prior appropriation also generates a large amount of litigation. Several western
states are currently plodding through massive court cases in an effort to
determine the water rights of existing users in certain river basins. These
"general adjudications" are seemingly endless, and they typically
involve thousands of parties. In Montana's massive statewide
adjudication, for example, "[als of 2001, after nineteen years, only 56
percent of the 219,413 claims filed with the water courts had been
adjudicated. Final decrees had been issued in 16,354 cases (7.5 percent)
and another 106,739 claims (49 percent) had received preliminary or
temporary preliminary decrees." 188 Among other ongoing general
adjudications, Arizona's Gila River adjudication began in 1974 and
involves the claims of 24,000 water users; Washington's Yakima
adjudication started in 1977 and involves 40,000 users; Idaho's Snake
River Basin adjudication began in 1987 and involves 185,000 users.1 89 As
a group, western water right adjudications are undoubtedly the biggest,
longest, and most cumbersome court cases in the U.S. legal system, and
some of the most expensive.
Even apart from these behemoth general adjudications, litigation
over water rights is common in the West. In Colorado, virtually all
matters involving water allocation and use must pass through the state's
system of water courts;190 in this pure prior appropriation state, litigation

185. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-77.
186. This is particularly true in the "pure" prior appropriation state of Colorado, where
the water courts are not authorized to consider environmental matters in deciding water
cases. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Arapahoe v. United States, 891 P.2d 952,
972 (Colo. 1995) and text accompanying supra note 129; Melinda Kassen, A CriticalAnalysis
of Colorado's Water Right Determinationand Administration Act of 1969, 3 U. DENy. WATER L.
REV. 58, 59 (1999).

187. See Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053-54 (Wash. 1993) (error to
consider environmental factors in general adjudication to determine existing water rights;
such factors "cannot operate to impair existing water rights," and considering such factors
in this context would be contrary to "long established principles of western water law").
See also Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 749-50 (Idaho 1995) (public trust
doctrine does not apply in water right adjudication).
188. TARLOCK ET AL., supranote 22, at 298.
189. Id. at 304.
190. See Kassen, supra note 186, at 59-62, 64-69.
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is thus the virtually exclusive means of resolving disputes over water. 191
In a 1993 decision, a divided Washington Supreme Court held that
litigation-in fact, a full-blown general adjudication -was necessary
before the state water agency could decide a dispute between rival
irrigators on the same stream; 192 the dissenting justices wrote,
"Prohibitively expensive and interminable litigation is what the majority
has fashioned as a solution.... 193 In fact, water rights cases generally
have a reputation of lasting forever. In deciding a long-running case
involving Imperial Irrigation District's (IID) allegedly wasteful water
use-an issue that was back in court once again in 2003194-the
California Court of Appeals wrote in 1990, "All things must end, even in
the field of water law." 195
4. Both Laws Have Shown Some Increased Flexibility of Late
Both prior appropriation and the ESA have developed a
reputation for rigidity. In recent years, however, both-especially the
ESA-have shown a limited but significant degree of new flexibility,
particularly where private parties are concerned.
One of the most important developments in endangered species
policy has been the boom in incidental take permits for non-federal
parties. A private landowner who submits a satisfactory HCP, with
commitments for endangered species conservation measures, can receive
a permit that insulates the landowner from liability for take in
connection with otherwise lawful activities, such as logging, farming, or
land development. 196 While environmentalists have often criticized
HCPs as a poor deal for listed species, 197 the Clinton administration saw
them as a way to provide habitat benefits on private lands while also
making the ESA more user-friendly. 198 Whatever their merits, HCPs became a popular tool for private landowners and local governments in the

191. Even though many cases do settle, the requirement of water court approval for
nearly all matters involving water rights does have significant consequences for water
decision making. Id. at 60-62.
192. Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 240 (Wash. 1993).
dissenting).
193. Id. at 242 (Guy, J.,
194. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03-CV-0069 W (FS) (S.D. Cal.) (filed
Jan. 10, 2003).
195. Before making this statement, the court stated, "We note from lID's brief that it has
'engaged for three decades in costly and critical litigation about its water rights."' Imperial
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 573 (Cal. App. 1990).
196. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
197. See Sheldon, supra note 109, at 310-13; Barry, supra note 162, at 130-31.
198. Barry, supra note 162, at 130-31.
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last decade, growing from a handful of approved plans in the early
1990s 199 to several hundred by 2001.200
Somewhat less successful, but still politically powerful, has been
the recent push to avoid ESA listing of species on the basis of conservation plans developed by federal, state, or local agencies. The Act does call
for such plans to be considered as one factor in determining whether a
species should be listed as threatened or endangered. 2 1 Courts have
held, however, that the Services may decline listing on this basis only if
the conservation plan is sufficiently certain, mandatory, reliable, and
backed by science. 2 2 In response to this caselaw, the Interior Department
has recently developed a policy allowing the Services to consider a
broader range of measures, including "formalized conservation efforts
that have not yet been implemented or have been implemented, but have
not yet demonstrated whether they are effective at the time of a listing
203
decision," in making listing determinations.
The Services have also sought to increase the Act's flexibility by
developing rules under section 4(d)20 4 that are tailored to a particular
threatened species and are thus somewhat narrower than the typical
blanket extension of the take prohibition. 205 These rules may identify
specific activities by private actors, local governments, or states that are
excluded from the take prohibition as to that particular species. 2 6 For
example, NMFS's 4(d) rule for Pacific Northwest steelhead, issued in
2000, provided thirteen specific take exemptions for such activities as
fishery management, routine road maintenance, and water diversions
20 7
with proper fish screens.
199. Only 14 HCPs were approved from 1982 to 1992. Sheldon, supra note 109, at 300.
200. By February 2001, the federal government had approved over 340 HCPs.
Thompson, supra note 121, at 267.
201. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
202. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1153-59 (D. Or.
1998), and cases cited therein.
203. Final Policy on Evaluating Conservation Efforts (PECE), 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100, 15,113
(Mar. 28, 2003). Similarly, the federal agencies have promoted Candidate Conservation
Agreements as a means to avoid ESA listing. Parenteau, supra note 141.
204. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000).
205. Since the late 1970s, the Interior Department has had a standing rule that generally
extends endangered species protections, including the take prohibition, to threatened
species. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife or Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2002). This
general rule may be superceded, however, by a special rule for a particular threatened
species that contains "all the applicable prohibitions and exceptions." 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(c)
(2002).
206. See Madeline J. Kass, Threatened Extinction of Plain Vanilla 4(d) Rules, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 78 (2001).
207. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b) (2002). The purpose of these exemptions was to provide "a
mechanism whereby entities can be assured that an activity they are conducting or
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Western water law has also shown some improved flexibility of
late, at least in a few states. Perhaps the most important recent
development is that some states are beginning to remove barriers to
transferring existing, consumptive water rights to instream use, allowing
restoration of flows that had been depleted by the exercise of established
water rights.20 8 Water right purchases and leases for instream flow grew
significantly in the 1990s, although they seem to have reached a plateau
(in terms of total quantity of water) in about 1995,209 and they remain a
small fraction of water right transactions in the West. 210 And even
211
though most states continue to bar privately held instream flow rights,
-have
a variety of private entities -primarily nonprofit organizations
212
begun working to facilitate water right transfers to instream use.
Similarly, a variety of "water banks" have begun to spring up
around the West. 213 These arrangements allow water right holders,
typically irrigators, to receive compensation for allowing someone else to
use their water rights for a specified period of time. Despite the fact that
water banks allow for transfers that are voluntary, remunerative, and
temporary, they are regarded by some as a long-term threat to
agricultural water supplies, 214 although not to the same degree as
permanent water transfers. While some water bank borrowing takes
place for municipal, industrial, and even irrigation purposes, several of
the new banks were set up largely to meet the water needs of listed
species. ESA requirements were the major catalyst for the formation of

permitting is consistent with ESA requirements....When such a program provides
sufficient conservation for listed salmonids, NMFS does not find it necessary to apply ESA
section 9(a)(1) take prohibitions to activities governed by those programs." 65 Fed. Reg.
42,422,42,423 (July 10, 2000).
208. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 22, at 355-57 (describing laws and institutions that
have developed to transfer water to environmental purposes in Oregon, Montana, Texas,
and Washington).
209. Barton H. Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
261, 270 (2000).
210. Of the 200 water transactions in 2002, only 15 were for "public trust" purposes,
compared to 167 for municipal uses. Annual Transaction Review, WATER STRATEGIST, Feb.
2003, at 16.
211. Thompson, supra note 209, at 287.
212. Id. at 271-72.
213. See Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Adler, New Directions in Western Water
Law: Conflict or Collaboration?,20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 33 (2000) (describing
water banks in Idaho and California); Hobbs, supra note 36, at 50 (noting that Colorado
recently enacted a statute providing for a pilot water bank in the Arkansas River Basin).
214. See Thompson, supra note 209, at 274-76 (discussing reasons for opposition to
market-based reallocation of water from agriculture to instream uses).
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the Edwards Aquifer bank in Texas, 215 the Environmental Water Account
217
in California, 216 and the Klamath Basin bank in Oregon/California,
among others.
C. Concluding Thoughts on the Similarities between Water Law and
the ESA
Even though these laws have recently shown a bit more
flexibility, both have proven remarkably resistant to fundamental
change-yet another similarity between the two. Except for expanded
recognition of legal protection for instream flows in the 1970s and 1980s,
western water law has changed little for several decades despite
criticism. 218 At its core, prior appropriation law still recognizes
permanent property rights based on beneficial use, gives highest priority
to the oldest water rights, and charges nothing for private use of a public
219
resource.
By the same token, the ESA has been highly controversial since
the late 1970s, but Congress has made only minor changes to the law
since the rather modest 1982 amendments. 220 The basic elements of the
Act regarding species listing, federal obligations to engage in
215. See Votteler, supra note 21, at 873-75; Todd H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer?
Or, the Beginning of the End to Fifty Years of Conflict over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 257 (2002).
216. See Alf W. Brandt, An Environmental Water Account: The California Experience, 5 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 426, 427-33 (2002).
217. See Paskus, supra note 9, at 10-12.
218. Leading commentators in the 1980s believed that western water law was about to
undergo fundamental change. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in
Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 344-45 (1985) (noting that "elements of the prior
appropriation system are failures in these times," and that western water law was in a
"time of transition"). However, the states never proceeded with basic water law reforms:
The 1990s began with the states expressing their intentions to adapt water
law and administration to the West's rapidly changing needs. State
politicians apparently embraced the essential reform proposals, raising
expectations for new legislation and aggressive administrative initiatives
that would, in turn, be tested in court... Actual political and legal
developments at the state level in the 1990s, however, fell short of the
expectations that seemed realistic in the late 1980s. Instead of staying
ahead of federal regulatory pressures, the states responded with modest
adjustments when they faced controls that seemed intolerable or when
they thought that growth was creating imminent shortages. As this section
shows, most changes in state law and policy were far from visionary;
rather, they were necessary responses to immediate problems.
Getches, supra note 35, at 23-24.
219. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
220. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000)).
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consultation and avoid jeopardy, and the broad ban on take of listed
animals, are essentially the same as they were in 1973. 221 One might say
that both the ESA and prior appropriation have stood the test of time.
The fundamental similarities discussed above are important but
often overlooked. In contrast, the fundamental differences between
western water law and the Endangered Species Act are equally
important and glaringly obvious. First, the water laws essentially
allocate a natural resource by creating a system of property rights
authorizing its use, whereas the ESA imposes regulatory limits on natural
resource management and use. Second, western water law is chiefly state
law, while the ESA is a federal statute carried out by federal agencies.
Third, a key principle of prior appropriation is maximum utilization of
water resources for human demands,222 while the Act seeks to protect
endangered species and the ecosystems on which they depend from "economic
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation."223
These fundamental differences probably make conflicts
inevitable, but the basic similarities between the water laws and the ESA
make their confrontations even more intractable. Each law seems to
provide nearly absolute protection to a certain interest, so representatives of each interest may believe that "the law" is clearly on their side,
thus reducing the chances for compromise. Accommodation is made
even more difficult because neither the ESA nor the water laws provide
much official consideration for competing interests. The lack of positive
incentives means that any real progress on conservation is not likely to
come through voluntary measures, but instead through enforcement or
regulatory actions that are inherently controversial. And because both
laws are mostly effective in preserving the status quo, they tend to be
ineffective in meeting future challenges such as habitat restoration, and
they often clash in places such as the Klamath and Rio Grande Basins
where the survival of listed species requires cutting back on established
water uses. Since both prior appropriation and the ESA have seen their
share of court battles, it is hardly surprising that where these laws have
crossed paths, the resulting litigation has been especially intense and
bitter.
As both laws have begun to show more flexibility, however,
some hope arises that the West will see more positive outcomes and
fewer bloody collisions at the dangerous intersection of water law and
221. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C.§ 1531 (2000)).
222. See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
223. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1531(a)(1) (2000).
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ESA. One example of such positive outcomes is found in the Walla Walla
Basin in Oregon and Washington, where private water users and federal
officials have reached a series of agreements to maintain certain flows in
a river that had been dried up by irrigation diversions throughout the
1900s. The agreements have temporarily protected the irrigators from
liability for take of threatened steelhead and bull trout, providing
enough water to keep the Walla Walla flowing while allowing the
irrigators to maintain their established practices with a somewhat
reduced supply. 224 Building on these agreements, a wide range of
government officials and Walla Walla Basin stakeholders -including
irrigators, environmental groups, and the Umatilla Tribes-have been
working to develop an HCP to cover water use and other activities
throughout the Walla Walla Basin. 225 The threat of ESA enforcement
catalyzed these actions, but they proceeded even though no litigation
was ever filed.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ESA AND WATER LAW REFORM
Broadly speaking, the big challenge here is to strike a sustainable
balance in water management: to manage water to ensure, as much as
possible, that the available water supplies can meet important human
needs while also supporting viable ecosystems. This challenge has
always been difficult in the West, where natural water supplies vary
greatly from season to season and year to year. In many areas, natural
supplies have long been inadequate to meet the full range of ecological
needs and human demands even in wet years. The challenge has grown
even larger in recent years, as the West has been the fastest-growing
region of the United States. 226 Climate change227 and further population

224. Bricker & Filippi, supra note 79, at 761-64; Filippi, supra note 17, at 22-10-12. These
creative agreements effectively settled a federal enforcement action for take before it was
actually filed. The agreements require the irrigators to allow certain flows to remain in the
Walla Walla River past their points of diversion and implement other measures to conserve
the species. The agreements are not in the form of HCPs and incidental take permits, but
they temporarily provide that same type of protection for both the species and the
irrigators.
225. Filippi, supra note 17 at 22-11-12.
226. The five fastest-growing states in percentage terms from 1990 to 2000 were all in
the Intermountain West: Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho held the top five
spots. Texas was number 8, and Washington, Oregon, and New Mexico were numbers 10,
11, and 12 respectively. California was number 18 in percentage terms, but it still led the
nation in absolute growth with more than 4.1 million new residents in the decade. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 PHC-T-2, TABLE 3, STATES RANKED BY PERCENT POPULATION
CHANGE: 1990 TO 2000 (Apr. 2, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
cen2000/phc-t2/tabO3.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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growth are likely to make the challenge even more daunting for future
generations of westerners.
It is fair and appropriate to question whether today's water laws
and the ESA are up to this challenge. As currently implemented - which,
as noted above, is often quite different from how the laws are actually
written228-both have serious shortcomings in promoting conservation
and sustainability. Some of the most important shortcomings -the lack
of attention to competing values, the failure to provide good incentives,
the focus on protecting the status quo rather than promoting positive
change-are ironically quite similar in both the ESA and western water
laws. If the goal is really a sustainable balance, both prior appropriation
and the ESA must be reconsidered.
Recent reform efforts, however, seem to have focused entirely on
the ESA. Revising the Act has been a top priority of many on Capitol Hill
since 1994, 229 and reform proponents are pursuing this goal with
renewed vigor in the current Congress. 230 Western politicians have given
special attention to the ESA's effects on water laws and water rights.
New Mexico's congressional delegation succeeded in getting an
appropriations rider that seriously restricts the amount and sources of
water available for the silvery minnow under the ESA.231 New Mexico
Representative Steve Pearce introduced H.R. 2603, a bill that would
sharply limit the Interior Department's power to make any changes to
existing water allocations and practices. 232 Idaho's Senator Mike Crapo,

227.

See Kenneth D. Frederick & Peter H. Gleick, WATER AND GLOBAL CLIMATE

CHANGE: POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON U.S. WATER RESOURCES 38-40 (1999), available at http://

www.iwrn.net/pdfdocs/climate.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
228. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
229. See Barry, supra note 162, at 131-32.
230. For example, the chairmen of the congressional committees with ESA jurisdiction
recently made the following statements in press releases: "For too long, the Endangered
Species Act has caused substantial harm to property owners while failing to fulfill its stated
purpose: to protect, conserve, and recover endangered species. The act itself has many
inherent problems....[I will work with subcommittee chair Mike Crapo] to reform the
Endangered Species Act." Press Release, Senate Environment & Public Works Committee
Chairman James Inhofe, Sen. Inhofe Says Endangered Species Act Is "Broken" (May 29,
2003). "We wouldn't cling to 30 year old science and regulatory policy for our national
health care and we shouldn't in the case of improving Endangered Species Act regulations.
At present, this law is bankrupt, literally as well as in species recovery." Press Release,
House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo, Critical Habitat for Endangered
Species: Bankrupt.. Literally (May 28, 2003).
231. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-137, §§ 208a208b, 117 Stat 1827 (2004); Minnow Language,supra note 20.
232. To impose limitations on the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to claim title
or other rights to water absent specific direction of law or to abrogate, injure, or otherwise
impair any right to the use of any quantity of water, H.R. 2603, 108th Cong. (2003).
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with five western cosponsors, has gone much further by introducing the
State Water Sovereignty Protection Act. This legislation does not
mention any environmental law, but "delegates to each State the
authority to regulate water" and provides that federal officials "may
exercise management and control over water in a State only in
compliance with the laws of the State in which the water is located." 23 3 In
other words, anything the U.S. government does to affect water may
only be done within state water laws, regardless of the federal interest
involved. The implications for ESA implementation are obvious.
In contrast, there has been little or no political push for
fundamental water law reform in recent years. Serious efforts at water
law reform at the state level seemed promising in the 1980s but since
then have virtually died out.234 The western states 235 helped develop the
"Park City Principles" a decade ago, recognizing "the pivotal role of
states in resolving water problems; the need to include all stakeholders
and to reflect public values in all water decisions; and the importance of
a holistic approach to resolving water problems." 236 The Park City
Principles also state that "the context for water management decisions is
changing faster than the traditional system can accommodate," 237 which
seems to be a recognition that the traditional system of western water
law needs revision. Today, the Western Governors' Association
continues to express support for the Park City Principles, 238 but its
website says nothing more specific about water law reform at the state
233. State Water Sovereignty Protection Act, S. 561, 108th Cong. § 4(a) (2003). The
cosponsors are Senators Enzi (Wyo.), Craig (Idaho), Domenici (N.M.), Burns (Mont.), and
Smith (Or.).
234. As explained by Professor Getches,
In the 1980s, progressive leaders in the West urged states to assume the
pivotal role in responding to emerging public values in water. They
recognized that the West was changing and that state responses could
defuse the growing federal influence on western water policy. Their policy
reform agenda included greater efficiency and conservation, conjunctive
use of groundwater, protection of instream flows, more comprehensive
planning, and inclusive public participation at the level closest to the
resource. Despite the efforts of reform-minded leaders, state water law
and policy in the West remained essentially static through the 1990s.
Getches, supra note 35, at 5.
235. The Western Governors' Association and its subsidiary Western States Water
Council convened a series of workshops in the first half of the 1990s to develop a set of
principles for water management that became known as the Park City Principles. D. Craig
Bell et al., Retooling Western Water Management: The Park City Principles, 31 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 303, 303-04 (1996).
236. Id. at 305.
237. Id.
238. WGA Policy Resolution 01-12, Watershed Restoration Through Partnerships(Aug. 14,
2001), at http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/01/0112.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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level. 239 Reforming the ESA, by contrast, is now the Western Governors'
"highest legislative priority." 240
Had the western states followed through with meaningful water
law reforms in the 1990s, the recent conflicts over water use and
endangered species might well have been less severe. Failure of these
reforms at the state level, however, has essentially forced the federal ESA
to do the heavy lifting of securing minimally sufficient water supplies for
imperiled fish and wildlife. As stated by Professor Getches,
[A] key to replacing federal controls was the creation of
innovative state programs to respond to the public's
State systems now risk
demands for water reform ....
important water issues in
the
most
of
some
as
obsolescence
to
unconventional federally
entrusted
the West are being
and locally-driven processes. The decline in the influence of
state water institutions is ironic not only because of the
time-honored myth of "state primacy" in water, but
because at the beginning of the [1990s], the states seemed
241
ready to take leadership in promoting change.
There are at least two policy arguments against weakening the
ESA while leaving the water laws alone. First, the western states are not
prepared to step up in the absence of the ESA; that is, they do not yet
have water laws and institutions that seem capable of meeting the
habitat needs of aquatic species, particularly where habitat restoration is
needed. 242 As noted above, nearly all the western states have provided
some legal recognition for instream flows within the prior appropriation
system, 243 but most have been reluctant to use that authority actively to
protect instream flows. 244 With rare exceptions, states have not begun to
take serious steps toward restoring flows that are already being depleted

239. See http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/index.htm#Water (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
240. WGA Policy Resolution 03-15, Reauthorization and Amendment of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (June 13, 2000), at http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/03/esa315.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
241. Getches, supra note 35, at 24.
242. See generally Bonnie G. Colby & Tamra Pearson d'Estree, Evaluating Market
Transactions,Litigation, and Regulation as Tools for Implementing Environmental Restoration, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 381 (2000) (describing necessary elements of successful habitat restoration
strategies, including both compulsory (regulatory) and market mechanisms).
243. Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United
States, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177, 179 (1998).
244. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 26, at 144; Getches, supra note 35, at 30-33.
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by the exercise of established water rights;245 in other words, states have
rarely been willing to do more than protect the status quo. Moreover,
there has been strong western opposition to the use of federal funding to
acquire existing water rights from irrigators and to convert these rights
to instream use-even though Congress would put up the money, and
246
even though water rights would be acquired only from willing sellers.
And because there is now little or no effort to reform western state water
laws, one should not expect anything different from the states in the
foreseeable future- especially if a weakened or circumscribed ESA no
247
longer provides effective motivation for change.
Second, the ESA has played a key role in launching cooperative
efforts to address long-term problems of water use and environmental
protection. The California Bay-Delta accord leading to the "CalFed"
initiative is probably the most famous example; 248 less publicized
examples include the Walla Walla River efforts discussed above, 249 the
Carson-Truckee water settlement, 250 and the cooperative agreement for
endangered fish recovery on the Upper Colorado River. 251 Some critics
have contended that the ESA impedes such cooperative efforts to resolve
the West's tough issues of water use and environmental protection; 252
245. See Neuman, supra note 39, at 953-56 (describing Oregon's failure to promote flow
restoration through improved water use efficiency under the state's salmon recovery plan);
Thompson, supra note 209 ("With few exceptions, states have not adopted aggressive
instream acquisition programs.").
246. See Filippi, supra note 17, at 22-17-18 (describing opposition to the proposed "Reid
Amendment" to the 2000 Farm Bill).
247. See Two Decades of Water Law and Policy Reform: A Retrospective and Agenda for the
Future, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 308, 311 (2001) (remarks of Prof. John D. Leshy, noting
that the ESA has provided the greatest pressure for changes in water use policies and
practices).
248. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 341, 366-67 (1996).
249. See supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
250. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Creation of New Risk Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes: The
Caseof the Truckee-Carson Settlement, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 674 (1999). According to Tarlock:
Ultimately, the success of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe in using the
Endangered Species Act to control the Basin's major source of unallocated
drought reserve carry-over storage-the Stampede reservoir on Truckee
River-created incentives for the urban stakeholders to seek a more
comprehensive Basin-wide long-term settlement. The net result is that
major stakeholders, with the exception of the [major irrigation district in
the basin], are slouching toward sustainable use and management.
Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
251. See Wood, supra note 21, at 229-30.
252. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 555 (1995); Western Governors' Association Policy Resolution 01-01-11, State
Conservation Agreements under the Endangered Species Act (Aug. 14, 2001), at
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however, many such efforts would never have been started without a
strong push under the ESA. 253 Without the Act, states and water users
may perceive no real reason to come to "the table" or no need to bargain
seriously if they do. In the words of one of the leading architects of the
landmark Bay-Delta accord:
The Bay-Delta experience also demonstrates that collaborative processes alone- regardless of how inclusive and
how well managed they are-often will not guarantee that
long-term, national values receive adequate protection.
Water users frequently need external incentives to put
water on the table for environmental protection -whether
those incentives are federal mandates, federal dollars, or
something else. Absent the mandates of the Clean Water
Act and the ESA, there would be no Bay-Delta Agreement
and, therefore, no enhanced protection for the natural
resources in that system. 254
Such negotiated efforts may offer the best hope, at least in the
short term, for reaching satisfactory solutions to water/ESA issues in the
West. Cooperation obviously has not always worked, but perhaps such
huge, nasty "train wrecks" as the 2001 Klamath Basin crisis will help
convince others that it is best to try to handle such matters
collaboratively. Where the water laws and ESA (as well as the players
involved) can both show a fair degree of flexibility, the chances for
workable solutions will be improved. Where Congress can provide
significant funding to implement such solutions, the chances for longterm success will be maximized.

http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/01/01_l1.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004) (arguing
that the ESA, as applied by the courts, undercuts efforts to work with private landowners
to ensure habitat protection and restoration).
253. Even though he ruled against plaintiff conservation groups' challenge to a 2001
Biological Opinion in the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow litigation, Judge Parker closed his
opinion with these extraordinary remarks:
I believe it is appropriate to compliment Plaintiffs' counsel for their work
on behalf of the endangered silvery minnow and the entire middle Rio
Grande system. It is my impression that at the time this lawsuit was filed,
not much was being done by the federal agencies, or by the other major
players with interests in the middle Rio Grande, to confront seriously the
hard, difficult issues that had to be addressed in order to protect the
minnow, and the river itself. By filing this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs' attorney
got the ball rolling, prompting all interested parties to come up with farreaching solutions to the problems that once seemed insurmountable.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, No. CV-99-1320, slip op. at 49 (D.N.M. Apr. 19, 2002).
254. Rieke, supra note 248, at 367.
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The basic similarities between the Act and the water laws raise
serious questions about whether critics actually dislike the ESA more for
its politics than its policy. If the real problem is that the Act is a stubborn,
single-interest law that generates litigation and fails to provide positive
incentives, then why do these critics so rarely object to prior
appropriation on these grounds? After all, such arguments apply with
equal or greater force to the water laws. Do they object to ESA because
the law is too hard-nosed, or because it is hard-nosed in defense of the
environment, not water users? Are they upset with the ESA because it
spawns litigation, or because environmentalists sometimes win these
cases at the expense of powerful economic interests? Do ESA critics bash
the Act because it is one-sided, or simply because it favors the wrong
side?
ESA critics speak of the need for "balance" in this area, 255 and
they may well believe that all that is necessary to achieve this balance is
to limit the power of the ESA over water. But if "balance" truly means
meeting both economic and ecological needs for water, we clearly will not
get it by simply subordinating the ESA to the water laws. What we will
get instead is prior appropriation-a system that, left to its own devices,
does poorly in providing this kind of balance.
Conflicts between humans and endangered species cannot be
blamed solely on endangered species. Likewise, conflicts between
western water law and the ESA cannot be blamed solely on the Act. The
very nature of these laws-their basic similarities as well as their betterrecognized differences - make some degree of conflict inevitable. The
West is still learning how to resolve these tough conflicts. One thing is
sure, however: we will not achieve a sustainable balance in water
management simply by removing strong legal protection for aquatic
ecosystems. Until there is real change in western water law and
management, the ESA must play a crucial role in counterbalancing prior
appropriation.

255.

See, e.g., Sen. Domenici, Senate Comm. ESA Hearing,supra note 5.

